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ABSTRACT
We consider eager-push epidemic dissemination in a com-
plete graph. Time is divided into synchronous stages. In
each stage, a source disseminates ν events. Each event is
sent by the source, and forwarded by each node upon its first
reception, to f nodes selected uniformly at random, where
f is the fanout. We use Game Theory to study the range of
f for which equilibria strategies exist, assuming that play-
ers are either rational or obedient to the protocol, and that
they do not collude. We model interactions as an infinitely
repeated game. We devise a monitoring mechanism that ex-
tends the repeated game with communication rounds used
for exchanging monitoring information, and define strate-
gies for this extended game. We assume the existence of a
trusted mediator, that players are computationally bounded
such that they cannot break the cryptographic primitives
used in our mechanism, and that symmetric ciphering is
cheap. Under these assumptions, we show that, if the size of
the stream is sufficiently large and players attribute enough
value to future utilities, then the defined strategies are Se-
quential Equilibria of the extended game for any value of f .
Moreover, the utility provided to each player is arbitrarily
close to that provided in the original game. This shows that
we can persuade rational nodes to follow a dissemination
protocol that uses any fanout, while arbitrarily minimising
the relative overhead of monitoring.
Categories and Subject Descriptors
C.2.4 [Computer-Communication Networks]: Distributed
Systems; K.6.0 [Management of Computing and Infor-
mation Systems]: General—Economics
General Terms
Theory, Economics, Reliability
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1. INTRODUCTION
This paper addresses the impact of rational behaviour in
epidemic dissemination protocols, executed over a complete
graph [6]. An epidemic dissemination protocol operates as
follows: a source splits a stream of bits into ν events, which
are sent to a set of f nodes chosen uniformly at random,
where f is known as the fanout ; nodes repeated this proce-
dure upon the first reception of each event. Protocols of this
type are know to achieve a good tradeoff between high reli-
ability of event delivery and communication overhead, and
have been used in a variety of applications such as video
streaming [15, 14]. In this context, rational behaviour may
be characterised by the aim of maximising a utility, given
as follows. Rational nodes value the stream, but they prefer
to send as few messages as possible, in order to spare band-
width. Therefore, the utility can be defined as the differ-
ence between the benefits, which increase with the number
of received events, and the communication costs for send-
ing messages. This setting poses the problem that rational
nodes always prefer not to forward any messages.
To address this issue, we explore the possibility of nodes
interacting repeatedly in multiple executions of the dissemi-
nation protocol, in order to hold nodes accountable for their
present behaviour by adjusting their utility in the future.
This models periodic streaming sessions (e.g., weekly sport-
ing events). Using Game Theory [17], we study incentives
to persuade rational nodes to follow the protocol, also ad-
mitting the possibility that some nodes may be acquiescent,
i.e., obedient to the protocol [3, 20]. We assume that rational
nodes do not collude. We model interactions as an infinitely
repeated game where future utilities are discounted to the
present by some factor δ ∈ (0, 1), which determines the value
given by players to future utilities1. This is adequate when
players are uncertain about the number of future interac-
tions and value utilities obtained in the present over future
ones [17]. Our aim is to study the range of the values of f
used by dissemination protocols that correspond to equilib-
ria strategies of the repeated game, that is, where no player
has any incentive to deviate from the protocol assuming that
other players also do not deviate.
When players interact repeatedly, incentives may be based
on direct or indirect reciprocity [18]. With direct reciprocity,
each player i adapts his strategy towards every other player
j in reaction to past actions of j directed towards i only. An
1We use the designations player and node to describe the
entities of the system: node refers to the operational side of
the entity; player refers to the (rational) user controlling the
node.
example is the tit-for-tat strategy [4, 7]. Most epidemic dis-
semination systems that cope with rational behaviour also
use direct reciprocity [15, 14, 12]. Unfortunately, strategies
of this type are vulnerable to the redundancy of epidemic
dissemination [19]. Namely, if a player i does not cooperate
with j, then at best j may punish i. However, when redun-
dancy is high, i has other neighbours from whom i receives
events. Hence, the impact of such punishment is arbitrarily
low, since i continues to receive events with sufficiently high
probability. This makes direct reciprocity an ineffective type
of incentives when f is large.
Indirect reciprocity circumvents the limitations of direct
reciprocity by having nodes sharing information regarding
private observations. This allows all the nodes to coordi-
nate on effective punishments against any player i by not
forwarding any event to i, decreasing his utility to 0. In
Game Theoretical terms, we can punish each player by de-
creasing his utility to the minimax value. Under this pos-
sibility, we might apply a well known set of results called
Folk Theorems, which state that we may devise equilibria
strategies for infinitely repeated games that provide any fea-
sible strictly positive utility to every player [16], given that
δ is sufficiently large. In particular, these results imply that
it is possible to sustain cooperation while using any fanout
for disseminating events. However, existing proofs of Folk
Theorems assume that some underlying monitoring infra-
structure provides information about the behaviour of each
node, at no cost to the players [16]. Such assumption is unre-
alistic, since any implementation of a monitoring mechanism
always incurs communication costs.
Goal : We show that cooperation can be sustained for any
fanout using a monitoring mechanism that is not free of
cost. For this purpose, we prove the existence of equilibria
strategies for the game induced by the monitoring mecha-
nism. We consider the notion of Sequential Equilibrium [13],
which is stronger than Nash Equilibrium (NE) since it ex-
cludes strategies that rely on non-credible threats. For in-
stance, when considering monitoring, the notion of NE does
not evaluate the optimality of a strategy when a player has
observed a deviation and has to communicate this fact to
other players. In line with the Folk Theorems, we also aim
at providing any feasible and strictly positive utility to each
player, which requires the minimisation of the communica-
tion overhead of monitoring relative to the original dissemi-
nation protocol. Existing works have faced the challenge of
implementing a distributed monitoring mechanism [9], and
performed a game theoretical analysis of epidemic dissemi-
nation [19]. To the best of our knowledge, none has studied
the range of f used by equilibria strategies of the repeated
epidemic dissemination game.
Challenges: To fulfil our goal, we define a monitoring
mechanism that extends the infinitely repeated epidemic
dissemination game with additional communication rounds,
and we propose a set of strategies for this game. In addition
to disseminating a stream of events, nodes review the be-
haviour of every player and share this information, which is
used to decide when to punish each player. When a punish-
ment against a player i is in place, no node sends events to
i, denying any benefit to i. This way, the threat of punish-
ment out-weighs the gain from deviating from the specified
strategy. The following main challenges are addressed:
Challenge 1: Strategic Monitoring. Players may deviate
when sharing monitoring information. For instance, a pun-
ishment of any player i causes the overall reliability of dis-
semination to decrease. Hence, players are not willing to
share information incriminating i.
Challenge 2: Mixed strategies. Nodes randomly select the
neighbours to forward each event. The difficulty lies in pre-
venting players from biasing this selection.
Challenge 3: Hidden Events. While observing the actions
of i, player j does not observe the set of events received by i.
Thus, the monitoring mechanism may raise false positives,
causing players to be punished undeservedly.
Challenge 4: Overhead of monitoring. Nodes cannot share
information regarding each disseminated event, otherwise
the overhead of monitoring is not minimised. Though, mon-
itoring only a subset of disseminated events introduces the
problem of false negatives, where misbehaviour is undetected.
Summary of Contributions: We devise a monitoring
mechanism and a set of strategies that are Sequential Equi-
libria of the extended game for any fanout, provided that
ν and δ are sufficiently large. These strategies also min-
imise the communication overhead of monitoring relative
to the original dissemination protocol. It is important to
notice that the overhead is minimised only relative to the
total size of the stream. We use symmetric cryptography
to cope with strategic monitoring. Assuming that symmet-
ric ciphering costs are negligible and players are computa-
tionally bounded, this allows cheap punishments to be ap-
plied to players, while creating incentives for them to con-
tinue forwarding events. Our results offer an improvement
over existing work towards the goal of designing a practical
monitoring mechanism [9], which does not consider strategic
monitoring. We use a pseudo-random number to address
the challenge raised by mixed strategies. We address the
challenge of hidden events by relying on a trusted mediator
to collect information about the events sent to and received
from each node i. We minimise monitoring overhead by
having nodes reporting in expectation on only a sub-linear
number of events. The mediator coordinates the selection of
these events to ensure that the probability of false negatives
is sufficiently low, and that no false positives are raised.
Paper Organisation: The remainder of the paper is or-
ganised as follows. In Section 2, we introduce our model.
Section 3 contains the monitoring mechanism and strategies.
In Section 4, we perform a Game Theoretical analysis of the
strategies to prove the main result. Section 5 concludes the
paper with a short discussion.
2. MODEL
We consider a synchronous message passing system with
reliable and authenticated communication. The set of nodes
is denoted by N , and n is its cardinality. We consider that
N is common knowledge2. Players do not collude and have
perfect recall. Time is divided into stages, which are further
divided into τ synchronous rounds. In each stage t, the
source disseminates a set E t of ν events, drawn from a much
larger but finite set E . The process of generating E t must be
sufficiently random, such that any player i can guess any e ∈
E t beforehand only with a sufficiently small probability. This
is to justify the assumption that players prefer to receive
2Every player knows this set, knows that every player knows
this set, and so on.
these events than to try to guess them. Every event e ∈ E t
has a unique identifier id ∈ {1 . . . ν}, and is disseminated as
follows: first, the source sends e to a subset of f neighbours
chosen uniformly at random, where f is the fanout. Then,
each node forwards e upon its first reception, also to a subset
of f neighbours selected uniformly at random. This process
ends until no node forwards e or until a maximum delay of
ρ rounds to deliver e is reached, after which the event is said
to expire. We assume that ρ does not increase with ν. A
different event is introduced in each round by the source.
We let τ ≥ ν + ρ to allow every event to be disseminated
until it expires. We consider that the source is obedient to
the protocol and may act as a trusted mediator. Using the
language of [3, 20], we say that the source is acquiescent.
We treat every other player as rational, although our results
still hold if other acquiescent players exist. In Section 5, we
discuss how to distribute the role of the mediator. Players
are assumed to be computationally bounded - they cannot
break the cryptographic primitives used in our strategies, in
the time required by a stage.
Interactions are modelled as an infinitely repeated epi-
demic dissemination game. An action of player i is a vector
~ai ∈ Ai specifying for each j ∈ N \ {i} a message ai(j) sent
by i to j. Messages contains a finite number of tuples (id, e),
where id ∈ {1 . . . ν} and e ∈ E . A history h ∈ H is a finite
sequence of action profiles ~a ∈ A specifying all the messages
sent after multiple rounds. Any player i cannot completely
observe a history; instead, i only observes a corresponding
private history hi ∈ Hi, specifying the messages sent and
received by i in h. We say that histories hi and h are from
stage t if the first round following these histories belongs
to t. A strategy σi ∈ Σi specifies a probability distribution
σi(.|hi) over the actions taken by i in the round immediately
succeeding the observation of hi. A strategy profile ~σ ∈ Σ
specifies the strategy followed by every player. Given any
~σ ∈ Σ, each player i forms a belief µ regarding the realised
history h ∈ H after the observation of hi ∈ Hi, in the form
of a probability µ~σ(h|hi). µ is also common knowledge. If
we fix some strategy profile ~σ that is expected to be followed
by any player, then in any realised history h ∈ H the be-
haviour of an acquiescent player i is always compatible with
i having followed ~σ in h. Henceforth, whenever referring to a
history h ∈ H and strategy profile ~σ ∈ Σ, we will implicitly
consider that the behaviour of the source (and the mediator)
in h is compatible with ~σ. Thus, we never analyse histories
where acquiescent entities have deviated in the past, since
this analysis is irrelevant to the proof of equilibrium. This
fact is also captured by the defined belief system: for any
hi ∈ Hi and h ∈ H, we have µ~σ(h|hi) > 0 only if all acquies-
cent entities have followed ~σ in h. This implies that i never
observes a deviation of some acquiescent entity in any hi.
2.1 Utility
The expected utility of the infinitely repeated game ob-
tained by any player i depends on the following factors: i)
the private history hi ∈ Hi observed by i, initially equal to
∅; ii) the strategy profile ~σ followed by every player; iii) the
belief system µ; and iv) the realised utility ui of receiving
events and sending messages during each stage following the
observation of hi. The pair (~σ, µ) allows i to form an expec-
tation of what occurred in the past, in terms of a probability
distribution over the histories h ∈ H. Given any h, i can
predict the future behaviour of any player j in any future
stage t, given that j follows σj . More precisely, ~σ defines a
probability distribution over the outcomes Zt ⊆ H of stage
t, where each outcome z ∈ Zt is a history that matches the
end of stage t. We denote by P ~σ(z|h) the probability of z
being reached after h, given that players follow ~σ. The re-
alised utility for stage t is a function ui(z) of the outcome
z ∈ Zt reached in stage t. This function quantifies the av-
erage benefits of receiving events and the average costs of
sending messages, per disseminated event. More precisely,
we consider that every player receives a benefit β per re-
ceived event e ∈ E t and incurs a cost α per bit sent in a
message. ui(z) is given by the total benefits minus the to-
tal costs. We divide ui(z) by ν in order to normalise it to
the average utility per disseminated event. We provide a
formal definition of ui(z) in Section 3.4, after defining the
monitoring mechanism.
With this in mind, the expected utility for stage t given
the observation of hi, denoted by E
~σ,µ,t(ui|hi), is the weighted
sum over every history h compatible with the observation of
hi and outcomes of stage t following h:
E
~σ,µ,t(ui|hi) =
∑
h∈H
∑
z∈Zt
µ~σ(h|hi)P ~σ(z|h)ui(z). (1)
Finally, for any i ∈ N and hi ∈ Hi from any stage t,
E
~σ,µ(ui|hi) is the weighted infinite sum over every stage t′ ≥
t of the expected utility of t′. We use a discount factor
δ ∈ (0, 1) to discount future utilities to the present:
E
~σ,µ(ui|hi) =
∑
t′≥t
δt
′−t
E
~σ,µ,t′(ui|hi). (2)
2.2 Notion of Equilibrium
We consider the notion of Sequential Equilibrium (SE) [13].
We say that a pair (~σ, µ) is a SE if it is Sequentially Rational
and Consistent. (~σ, µ) is Sequentially Rational if σi max-
imises E~σ,µ(ui|hi) for any hi ∈ Hi, conditional on the belief
that other players follow ~σ after hi is observed. Formally,
let (σ′i, ~σ−i) be the strategy profile where every j ∈ N \ {i}
follows σj ∈ ~σ−i and i follows σ′i.
Definition 2.1. The pair (~σ, µ) is Sequentially Rational
iff for every i ∈ N , hi ∈ Hi, and σ′i ∈ Σi, it holds:
E
~σ,µ(ui|hi) ≥ E(σ
′
i,~σ),µ(ui|hi).
We do not include the formal definition of Consistency
(c.f. [13]). Informally, (~σ, µ) is Consistent if µ is defined
using the Bayes rule according to the behaviour specified
by ~σ, whenever possible. When some hi is observed that
is inconsistent with the hypothesis that players have been
following ~σ, the definition of consistency requires the spec-
ification of an alternative hypothesis for explaining the ob-
served behaviour. We fix a belief system µ that suits our
purposes, defined as follows. For any ǫ > 0, define ~σǫ as
the strategy profile where every i follows σi(.|hi) after each
hi ∈ Hi with probability 1 − ǫ, and, with probability ǫ, i
follows any available action with positive probability. Since
every history is consistent with players following ~σǫ, we can
apply the Bayes rule to completely define µ~σ
ǫ
. Then, we
set µ~σ(.|hi) = limǫ→0 µ~σǫ(.|hi). The intuition is that the
observed behaviour is explained by players following ~σ and
occasionally making mistakes with a small probability.
The above definition of Sequentially Rational pair (~σ, µ)
is problematic, since it requires the analysis of all possible
alternative strategies to that specified by ~σ. Fortunately,
we can simplify this task by analysing only local deviations
according to the One-deviation Property [10]. A local devi-
ation for player i after private history hi ∈ Hi is an action
that is not prescribed by σi with positive probability, while
every player still follows ~σ after i observes hi, and i fol-
lows σi in every round following the deviation. Formally,
let E~σ,µ(ui|hi,~ai) denote the expected utility of i when ev-
ery player follows ~σ after hi is observed, except only that i
follows ~ai immediately after observing hi.
Proposition 2.2. One-deviation [10]. The pair (~σ, µ)
is Sequentially Rational iff for every i ∈ N , hi ∈ Hi, and
~ai,~a
′
i ∈ Ai such that σi(~ai|hi) > 0, it holds:
E
~σ,µ(ui|hi,~ai) ≥ E~σ,µ(ui|hi,~ai).
2.3 Central Claim
In line with Folk Theorems [16], we aim at defining equi-
libria strategies for any fanout f , while providing to each
player any strictly positive expected utility of the dissem-
ination game as the average utility of the repeated game.
The average utility is computed as (1− δ)E~σ,µ(ui|∅), where
∅ is the initial empty history. When all players forward
events using a fanout f , the expected utility for any stage
is u¯(f) = q(f)(β − γf), where q(f) is the probability of a
given node receiving each event, β is the benefit per event,
and γ is the cost for forwarding the event. Folk Theorems
imply that, if β > γf and δ is sufficiently large, then an
equilibrium strategy for the infinitely repeated game exists
that yields u¯(f) to every player as the average utility of the
repeated game. In this work, we aim to prove a slightly
weaker result. First, we can only ensure the existence of
such strategy if β > cγf for some constant c > 0 that may
be greater than 1 3. Second, we need both δ and ν to be suf-
ficiently large. Finally, due to the overhead of monitoring,
we can only provide to each player a utility arbitrarily close
but never exactly equal to u¯(f). Theorem 2.3 formalises the
central claim.
Theorem 2.3. Fix any fanout f and constant ǫ > 0.
There exist a monitoring mechanism, a strategy profile ~σ
for the dissemination game, and a belief system µ, and there
exist constants c > 0, δ¯ ∈ (0, 1), and ν¯ ∈ N, such that, if
β > cγf , then, for every δ ∈ (δ¯, 1) and ν > ν¯, (~σ, µ) is a SE
and, for every i ∈ N :
|(1− δ)E~σ,µ(ui|∅) − u¯(f)| < ǫ.
The core of the proof of this theorem is the definition of a
monitoring mechanism executed every stage that, combined
with a dissemination strategy, provides a SE. Also, its costs
are sub-linear on ν. By dividing by ν, we obtain the aver-
age monitoring costs per event. For an arbitrarily large ν,
the impact of monitoring in the expected utility is arbitrar-
ily small. Alternatively, we could fix ν and minimise the
overhead of monitoring by only executing the mechanism
once every period of t stages. Here, we could arbitrarily
increase t to decrease the impact of monitoring. This alter-
native approach would be almost identical to the one used in
this paper, both in terms of the definition of the monitoring
mechanism and the main arguments of the proof, albeit its
greater complexity. We discuss this possibility in Section 5.
3With appropriate optimisations, we can get c ≤ 3.
3. MONITORING MECHANISM
We extend the dissemination game by adding τM moni-
toring rounds to each stage. For convenience, these rounds
are added at the beginning of the stage. Therefore, a stage
is now divided into τ = τM+ τD rounds: the first τM rounds
are used for exchanging monitoring information; the last τD
rounds are used to disseminate events as in the dissemina-
tion game. Recall that ρ is the maximum delay to deliver
any event. We still set τD ≥ ν + ρ to allow every event to
be disseminated until it expires. The trusted mediator is
responsible for collecting monitoring information from each
node. This consists in accusations and reports. An accu-
sation flags a deviation of some player, whereas a report,
which is relative to some id ∈ {1 . . . ν}, indicates for each
pair of nodes (i, j) whether i sent to/received from j a tuple
containing id. For each f > 0, we define a strategy profile
~σf , and fix a belief µf that is Consistent with ~σf as de-
fined in [13]. The main incentive for players to not deviate
is based on indirect reciprocity. The mediator collects ac-
cusations and reports in stage t relative to the behaviour of
each player i in stage t− 1, and gives a verdict on whether
i should be punished during stage t. If i is punished, then i
is still obliged to incur costs in stage t; if i deviates again,
then his punishment is extended to stage t+ 1. We address
the main challenges as follows:
Strategic Monitoring : We enforce the following two prop-
erties. First, each player i is only allowed to send moni-
toring information relative to other nodes; information sent
by i has no effect on the probability of i being punished.
Second, regardless of the punishments being applied, the re-
liability of dissemination remains constant. We achieve this
using commutative symmetric ciphering. For each node i,
the mediator sends a key κi to every node j 6= i, used by j to
cipher events sent to i. While being punished, i is unable to
retrieve the disseminated events. However, i still forwards
each ciphered event normally. Every node j 6= i receiving
such event is aware that i is being punished and is capable
of retrieving the original event, given his knowledge of κi.
Mixed Strategies: In dissemination rounds, every node i
forwards each received event to a set S of f nodes. To
prevent players from biasing the selection of S, S is specified
by a pseudo-random number generator (PRNG), seeded by
a random number sdi, sent by the mediator to i only.
Hidden Events: For each pair of nodes (i, j) and id ∈
{1 . . . ν}, i reports to the mediator the round when i first
received from/sent to j a tuple containing id. Given these
reports, the mediator is able to determine whether i received
id and forwarded it as expected. More precisely, the media-
tor verifies whether i forwarded id as specified by PRNG and
sdi, immediately after its first reception. For each identifier
id not received by i, the mediator verifies if i did not send a
tuple with identifier id. If any of the above conditions fails,
then the mediator triggers a punishment of i.
Monitoring Overhead : Nodes report only on a subset of
events selected by the mediator in a non-deterministic fash-
ion. The expected number of reported events is sub-linear
on ν, such that the relative overhead of monitoring decreases
as ν increases. More precisely, we split the identifier space
{1 . . . ν} into nS sequences, each containing nE different iden-
tifiers. We define τM = 2nS + 2. In the first monitoring
round, nodes send accusations to the mediator. In each even
round r < τM, for each node i, the mediator decides whether
to monitor the identifiers from the sequence corresponding
to r, with independent probability p∗. If so, then the me-
diator sends a notification to every node j 6= i, in which
case j must report, in round r + 1, on the identifiers from
the corresponding sequence. In the last round, the mediator
sends the seeds, the keys, and the verdicts on each player.
These parameters are specified in Section 4.3.
We now describe the main components of the monitoring
mechanism in more detail.
3.1 Symmetric Cipher
Let K be the set of keys. For any key κ ∈ K, let (v)κ
be the operation that returns datum v ciphered with κ. We
will consider primitives for which the ciphering operation is
the same as that of deciphering. Hence, we consider that it
holds ((v)κ)κ = v. We need the following two properties to
be fulfilled:
Integrity. For every κ ∈ K and e ∈ E , (e)κ ∈ E .
Commutativity. For every κ, κ′ ∈ K, ((v)κ)κ′ = ((v)κ′)κ.
These properties hold when using any stream cipher, for
which the ciphering operation consists in applying an xor
between the datum and a stream of bits generated from
the key. We need Integrity to ensure that players only send
valid dissemination messages, regardless of the punishments.
Commutativity is required for the scenarios when multiple
punishments are applied simultaneously. More precisely, we
need every player to be able to obtain disseminated events
while not being punished. Moreover, we need every node to
punish other nodes while being punished. This raises the fol-
lowing possibility. Consider nodes 1 to 4, and suppose that
exactly both nodes 2 and 3 are being punished. Consider the
following sequence of dissemination steps of event e: node 1
sends e1 = (e)κ2 to node 2; node 2 sends e
2 = (e1)κ3 to node
3; and node 3 sends an event e′ to node 4. Since 4 is not
being punished, we need to ensure that he is able to retrieve
e from e′. If 3 were to send ((e)κ2)κ3 , then this would only
be possible if 4 knew that the event followed the path 1, 2, 3.
Instead, 3 sends e′ = (e2)κ2 . By Commutativity, it holds
e′ = (e)κ3 . Since 4 knows κ3, he only needs to know that 3
is being punished in order to be able to retrieve e from e′.
With this in mind, a node being punished may receive
any event e ciphered with κi, and possibly ciphered with κj
for some j 6= i. In order for punishments to be effective,
i must not be able to retrieve e when it has no access to
κi, and has not received e in plain, regardless of what dis-
semination messages i may have received in the past. For
this purpose, we need to ensure that: 1) i never receives
κi, which is true by construction of our strategy; and 2)
κi 6= κj for every j ∈ N \ {i}, ensuring that ((e)κi)κj 6= e
for any e ∈ E . In addition, we need the following property to
hold. Intuitively, before receiving any tuple with identifier
id, i can guess the corresponding event e ∈ E t with a small
probability p. Non-disclosure ensures that i does not gain
information that allows him to guess e with a probability
significantly higher than p, provided that i only receives e
ciphered with κi, and possibly with κj for some j ∈ N \{i}.
Formally, fix any i ∈ N , hi ∈ Hi from any stage t and
id ∈ {1 . . . ν}. Let E ti (hi, id) ⊆ E be the set of events such
that for any e ∈ E ti (hi, id) there exists j ∈ N \ {i} and
dissemination round r from stage t preceding the observation
of hi such that j sends (id, e) to i in round r. We say that i
has not received e ∈ E t in hi in plain iff for e′ = (e)κi :
E ti (hi, id) ⊆ {e′} ∪ {(e′)κj |j ∈ N \ {i}}.
Let P (e|hi) be the probability of i guessing e after the
observation of hi. We need the following property to hold:
Non-disclosure. For any ǫ > 0, there exists a symmetric
ciphering primitive such that, for any player i ∈ N , private
history hi ∈ Hi from stage t ∈ N, and event e ∈ E t dis-
seminated with identifier id ∈ {1 . . . ν}, if i has not received
e in plain in hi, then for any h
′
i ∈ Hi from stage t that
fulfils E ti (h′i, id) = ∅ and E ti (h′i, id′) = E ti (hi, id′) for every
id′ ∈ {1 . . . ν} \ {id}, it holds:
P (e|hi) ≤ P (e|h′i) + ǫ.
These properties can be fulfilled by using a block ciphering
algorithm with the CTR mode of operation [5, 11]. A careful
selection of keys is also required. To simplify, we have the
mediator selecting a new unique key per node in each stage,
generated uniformly at random.
3.2 Pseudo-Random Number Generator
We assume the existence of a function SGfi per node i,
defined as follows. Given a seed sdi, this function returns a
sequence of subsets, where SGfi (sdi, id) ⊆ N \{i} is the of f
nodes to whom i must forward the event with identifier id.
We need SGfi to fulfil the following requirements. Assuming
that sdi is chosen uniformly at random, the probability of
SGfi (sdi, id) returning any subset S of f nodes is arbitrar-
ily close to the probability p of i selecting S uniformly at
random. Second, we need the stronger requirement of condi-
tional independence. Namely, if we fix the subsets generated
by SGfi for any identifier other than id, then the probability
of SGfi (sdi, id) returning any subset is still arbitrarily close
to p. This is formalised by the following property, where
P SG
f
i (~S|~S−id) is the probability of SGfi (sdi, id) returning a
sequence of subsets ~S given that the seeds are selected uni-
formly at random among those that yield any sequence ~S′
such that Sid′ = S
′
id′ for every id
′ ∈ {1 . . . ν}\{id}, indepen-
dently of the value of S′id.
PRNG1. Fix any node i ∈ N and sequence of subsets
~S = (Sid)id∈{1...ν} with Sid ⊆ N \ {i} and |Sid| = f for
every id ∈ {1 . . . ν}. For any constant ξ > 0, there exists a
function SGfi such that for every id ∈ {1 . . . ν}:∣∣∣∣∣P SG
f
i (~S|~S−id)− 1(n−1
f
)
∣∣∣∣∣ ≤ ξ.
This property can be fulfilled by a PRNG function such
as the one used in [2]. Additional details are included in Ap-
pendix B.
3.3 Strategy
It is useful to define ~σf using a state machine represen-
tation [17]. Each history hi ∈ Hi is mapped into a private
state of each player i. Transitions between states occur when
players follow any action profile ~a ∈ A. Given any hi ∈ Hi,
σfi (.|hi) suggests a probability distribution over the set of
actions available to i after the observation of hi. i may or
may not follow this suggestion, such that a state may be
reached where i knows he has deviated in the past. The
only exception is acquiescent players, who never deviate.
We now specify the state, transition rules, and strategy for
every i ∈ N , including the source.
3.3.1 State
Let rn ∈ {1 . . . τ} be the round number. Node i keeps
for each node j a variable Θi(j) ∈ {Good ,Bad}, where
Θi(j) = Good iff i has observed only valid actions from
j. In addition, i keeps a set Missi of sequences of identifiers
that contain identifiers that were not forwarded appropri-
ately according to SGfi . For each node j, i keeps two sets
REi(j) and SEi(j) of tuples (id, r), representing events with
identifier id received from and sent to j in round r, respec-
tively. Finally, PEi contains tuples (id, e) with an identifier
id and an event e to be forwarded. An important aspect is
that this state is finite, implying that memory is bounded.
3.3.2 Transition Rules
Algorithm 1 contains the pseudo-code. Every node ini-
tialises Θi(j) = Good at the beginning of each stage and
sets Θi(j) = Bad when j does not follow a valid action
(Lines 12 and 17). Valid actions are enumerated as follows.
In monitoring rounds, each message has a fixed size. In the
first monitoring round, node i must send to the mediator
for each j 6= i a message the size of an accusation against
j. In any even monitoring round, for each node j 6= i such
that the mediator requested the corresponding sequence of
identifiers, i must send two tuples per identifier id from the
requested sequence. If sufficient information is not avail-
able, then i must send padding. In a dissemination round, i
is allowed to send any set of tuples (id, e), but only one tuple
per identifier. Moreover, the identifier must not have expired
and must have already been introduced. More precisely, de-
fine age(id, r) = r + 1 − (id + τM). Event with identifier
id is introduced in round r such that age(id, r) = 1, i.e.,
r = τM + id. A tuple containing id and sent in round r is
valid iff age(id, r) ∈ {1 . . . ρ}. This restriction ensures that
in any round every player has to forward at most ρ tuples
to f nodes. To simplify, we assume that every node has
sufficient bandwidth to send ρf tuples in a single round.
Node i registers in REi(j) and SEi(j) for each id ∈ {1 . . . ν}
the round number when j first sent to and received from
i a tuple containing id, in a valid dissemination message
(Lines 19 and 23). When i receives id for the first time and
id has not expired (age(id, rn) ≤ ρ), i selects a tuple (id, e)
to be forwarded, sent by some node j chosen according to
some deterministic rule such as the node with smallest iden-
tifier (Lines 25-30). Not every deterministic rule is allowed,
since we need to ensure that in any two scenarios 1 and 2
where the set of nodes S sending id to i in scenario 1 is a
subset of scenario 2, and j ∈ S is selected in 2, then j is
also selected in 1. An alternative valid rule would be the
node with the largest identifier. If j is being punished, then
i forwards (id, (e)κj ) instead (Line 29). Let seq(id) denote
the sequence to which identifier id belongs to. i adds seq(id)
to Missi whenever i knows that, if the mediator requests
reports relative to seq(id), then i will be punished (Line 21).
This occurs exactly when the reports relative to id are in-
consistent: i sends a tuple containing id to j /∈ SGi(sdi, id)
(Line 33), i fails to send id to j ∈ SGi(sdi, id) immediately
after the first reception of id (Line 38), or i sends id prior
to receiving it (Line 40). Notice that we update REi af-
ter updating Missi, such that identifiers first received in the
present round do not count as being inconsistent.
3.3.3 Strategy Definition
The pseudo-code is included in Algorithm 2. Player i stops
Algorithm 1 Transition Rules
1: After first monitoring round
2: rn ← 1
3: PEi,Missi ← ∅
4: for all j ∈ N do
5: REi(j), SEi(j) ← ∅
6: Θi(j) ← Good
7: Set Θi(i) = Bad if i sent invalid message
8: End
9: After any other monitoring round
10: rn ← rn+ 1
11: for all j ∈ N do
12: Update Θi(j)
13: End
14: After dissemination round
15: rn ← rn+ 1
16: for all j ∈ N do
17: Update Θi(j)
18: for all valid id sent by i to j for the first time do
19: Add (id, rn) to SEi(j)
20: for all id ∈ {1 . . . ν}: inconsistent(id, SEi, REi) do
21: Add seq(id) to Missi
22: for all valid id sent by j to i for the first time do
23: Add (id, rn) to REi(j)
24: for all id ∈ {1 . . . ν} received for the first time do
25: if age(id, rn) ≤ ρ then
26: j ← node with smallest identifier to send id
27: e ← event such that j sent (id, e)
28: if i received accusation against j then
29: e ← (e)κj
30: Add (id, e) to PEi
31: End
32: Predicate inconsistent(id, S, R)
33: if ∃
j/∈SG
f
i
(sdi,id)
∃r (id, r) ∈ S(j) then
34: return True
35: else if ∃j,r (id, r) ∈ R(j) then
36: r ← minimum round when i received id in R(j)
37: if age(id, r) ∈ {1 . . . ρ− 1} then
38: if ∃
l∈SG
f
i
(sdi,id)
(id, r + 1) /∈ S(j) then
39: return True
40: else if ∃j,r (id, r) ∈ S(j) then
41: return True
42: else
43: return False
44: EndPredicate
sending messages once Θi(i) = Bad , since a punishment in
the next stage is inevitable. In the first monitoring round,
i sends an accusation against j 6= i iff Θi(j) = Bad at the
end of the previous stage (Line 4). In an even monitoring
round, the mediator notifies i for each node j 6= i whether i
should report on the sequence S of identifiers corresponding
to the current round, with probability p∗ (Line 9). When i
receives this notification, i sends for each identifier id ∈ S
any tuples (id, r) ∈ REi(j) and (id, r′) ∈ SEi(j) (Lines 12-
16). In the last monitoring round, the mediator notifies
every node l 6= j that j must be punished when some node
k 6= j has sent an accusation against j, or he detects an
inconsistency regarding some id ∈ {1 . . . ν}, according to
the reports REj and SEj regarding events received and sent
by j, respectively (Lines 19-27). The mediator also sends
sdi to i and κi to every j 6= i, ensuring that κi is unique.
In a dissemination round, i sends any tuple (id, e) ∈ PEi
to every j ∈ SGi(sdi, id), ciphering e with κj if j is being
punished (Lines 30-34). Notice that i only sends a tuple
Algorithm 2 Strategy
1: Upon first monitoring round of stage t > 1
2: for all j ∈ N do
3: if Θi(j) = Bad then
4: Send accusation against j to mediator
5: Send padding
6: End
7: Upon even monitoring round rn < τM | i is the mediator
8: for all j ∈ N do
9: With probability p∗, send (j,Monitor) to every l 6= j
10: End
11: Upon odd monitoring round | 1 < rn < τM and Θi(i) = Good
12: for all j ∈ N \ {i}: mediator sent (j,Monitor) do
13: Sj ← current sequence of identifiers
14: Send all tuples (id, r) ∈ REi(j) with id ∈ Sj
15: Send all tuples (id, r) ∈ SEi(j) with id ∈ Sj
16: Send padding
17: End
18: Upon last monitoring round τM | i is mediator
19: for all j ∈ N do
20: if ∃l 6=j l sent accusation against j then
21: Send accusation against j to every o ∈ N
22: else if ∃id inconsistent(id, SEj , REj) then
23: Send accusation against j to every l ∈ N
24: sdj ← random value
25: Send sdj to j
26: κj ← unique random key
27: Send κj to every l 6= j
28: End
29: Upon dissemination round | Θi(i) = Good
30: for all (id, e) ∈ PEi : seq(id) /∈ Missi do
31: for all j ∈ SGi(sdi, id) do
32: if i has accusation against j then
33: e ← (e)κj
34: Send (id, e) to j
35: End
36: Upon dissemination of event e ∈ Et | i is the source
37: id ← rn− τM + 1
38: Add (id, e) to PEi
39: End
(id, e) if seq(id) /∈ Missi. This is because once i fails to send
some identifier from sequence seq(id), sending id as specified
by SGi does not affect the probability of being punished in
the next stage. Thus, it is optimal to drop every tuple with
an identifier from that sequence. Later, we specify how to
define p∗ such that for every identifier id with seq(id) /∈ Missi
it is still optimal for i to forward id.
3.4 Realised Utility
We now define ui(z) for every outcome z ∈ Zt of any
stage t. We consider that every player i incurs a fixed cost
α per bit sent in any message. In addition, i obtains a
benefit β per event e ∈ E t received by i during stage t. We
denote the set of received tuples by reci(z), where for every
(id, e) ∈ reci(z) we have e ∈ E t. Two issues arise when
trying to define reci(z): 1) the exact definition of i receiving
(id, e) and 2) the reception of ciphered events.
Regarding the first issue, since we are considering reliable
communication channels, i receives (id, e) iff some node j 6= i
sends (id, e) to i. Thus, we may consider that i obtains
a benefit β in this case. However, given our definition of
strategies, it is possible that i sends (id, e) to some node
before receiving it in the first place, and then this tuple loops
back to i. Such behaviour increases the expected utility of
i. Since i is unlikely to guess e beforehand, we consider that
i values e iff i knows that it could not have been introduced
by i. More precisely, i receives a benefit β per disseminated
tuple (id, e) with e ∈ E t iff some j 6= i sends (id, e) to i in
round r of stage t, and i has not sent (id, e) to any node in
any round r′ < r.
Regarding the second issue, it is possible that i never re-
ceives some e ∈ E t in plain, but instead ciphered with the
key κj of some node j 6= i. We define the strategy in a
way that, if e′ = (e)κj and i receives e
′, then it is because
j is being punished, j has sent e′ to i, and i knows that j
is being punished. Hence, i is able to compute (e′)κj , in
which case we say that i can retrieve e from e′. Naturally, i
can retrieve e whenever i receives e in plain. In addition, it
may be possible that a history is reached where i receives e
ciphered with multiple different keys and i is still able to re-
trieve e. To generalise this intuition, we say that i is able to
retrieve e from e′ whenever i can perform some computation
over e′, given the history of interactions with other nodes,
in order to obtain e. i can retrieve e from e′ when e = e′.
Also, if i can retrieve e from e′, i receives e′′ = (e′)κj from
j, and i knows that j is being punished with key κj , then i
can retrieve e from e′′. By Non-disclosure, if some j sends
(id, e′) to i and e′ = (e)κi or e
′ = ((e)κi)κj , then i cannot
retrieve e from e′. We do not make any further assumptions
regarding when i can retrieve e from e′.
With this in mind, we consider that, for any e ∈ E t dis-
seminated by the source with identifier id, we have (id, e) ∈
reci(z) iff there exists a round r from stage t and node
j ∈ N \ {i} such that j sends (id, e′) to i in round r, i
can retrieve e from e′, and i has not sent (id, e′) to any node
in any round r′ < r from stage t. This leads to the follow-
ing definition of realised utility. Recall that we normalise
the total benefits and costs to the average per disseminated
event, by dividing it by ν. Let |zt,ri (j)| represent the size of
the message sent by i to j ∈ N in round r of stage t:
ui(z) =
1
ν

β · |reci(z)| − α ·
τ∑
r=1
∑
j∈N\{i}
|zt,ri (j)|

 . (3)
4. ANALYSIS
The analysis is divided into three parts. First, we show
correctness properties of ~σf for any f > 0. Then, we com-
pare the utility of following ~σf with that of deviating. We
conclude with the proof of the main result.
We use the notation vh and vhi to denote the value of
state variable v after any histories h and hi are realised, re-
spectively. In this context, we say that a history h′ succeeds
h if h′ is reached with positive probability when players fol-
low ~σf after h; h′ immediately succeeds h if h′ is reached one
round after h. Similarly, h′ precedes h if h′ is a starting sub-
sequence of h; h′ immediately precedes h if rnh = rnh
′
+ 1.
The proof relies the following facts regarding any node i
and history h from stage t: i) for any z ∈ Zt succeeding h,
Θzi (i) = Θ
h
i (i) and Miss
z
i = Miss
h
i ; ii) Θ
h
i (i) = Good if and
only if, for every j ∈ N and id ∈ {1 . . . ν}, Θhj (i) = Good ;
and iii) for any sequence of identifiers s, we have s ∈ Misshi
if and only if there exists id ∈ {1 . . . ν} such that s = seq(id)
and the reports relative to i are inconsistent with regard to
id, such that if every player follows ~σf in the future, then i is
punished if and only if the mediator requests the identifiers
from a sequence in Misshi .
The analysis relies on the following proposition, which fol-
lows by construction of the strategy.
Proposition 4.1. For any history h ∈ H from stage t ∈
N and node i ∈ N , the following hold: 1) for any z ∈ Zt
succeeding h, Θzi (i) = Θ
h
i (i) and Miss
z
i = Miss
h
i ; 2) Θ
h
i (i) =
Good iff, for every j ∈ N \ {i}, Θhj (i) = Good; and 3) for
any identifier id ∈ {1 . . . ν}, we have id ∈ Misshi iff there
exists id′ ∈ seq(id) such that the reports relative to i are
inconsistent with regard to id′.
Proof. Fix t, h, and i. Fix z succeeding h. i only
changes Θi(i) from Good to Bad . Thus, if Θ
h
i (i) = Bad ,
then Θzi (i) = Bad . Otherwise, i only changes Θ
h
i (i) after
h if i sends an invalid message, which never occurs while
i follows σfi . Therefore, Θ
h
i (i) = Θ
z
i (i). By construction,
while following σfi , i forwards every tuple with identifier id
and seq(id) /∈ Misshi , first received in round r, to exactly all
the nodes from SGfi (sdi, id) in round r + 1. Thus, i never
adds any new sequence to Misshi while following σ
j
i , imply-
ing that Misshi = Miss
z
i . This proves 1). Now, recall that
every j ∈ N initialises Θj(i) = Good at the beginning of
stage t. If Θhi (i) = Bad , then i sent an invalid message to
some j 6= i, implying that Θhj (i) = Bad . Otherwise, no j
updated Θj(i) to Bad . This proves 2). Finally, since i ini-
tialises Missi = ∅ in stage t, we have id ∈ Misshi iff there
exists id′ ∈ seq(id) such that inconsistent(id′,SEhi ,REhi ) is
true. By construction, this holds iff the reports relative to i
are inconsistent with regard to id′. This proves 3).
4.1 Correctness
We show two sets of properties regarding monitoring and
dissemination. Monitoring properties characterise the prob-
ability of any node i ∈ N being punished in the present or
future stages as a function of the current state. Dissemi-
nation properties quantify the probability of any node i re-
ceiving events, already disseminated or disseminated only in
the future, as a function of the current state and the present
action ~ai of i. This allows us to compute the expected util-
ity of any player i for each possible action he takes in the
present, and this way prove that our strategies are SE by
applying the One-deviation Property.
Lemma 4.2 enumerates monitoring Properties M1-M4 valid
for any player i and history h, assuming that every player
follows ~σf after h. M1-M3 state that the probability of i
being punished in the next stage is a function of Θhi (i) and
Misshi , while i is never punished in future stages other than
the next. In addition, Property M4 shows that i cannot in-
fluence the punishments being applied to him in the present
stage by only deviating in the current round.
Lemma 4.2. For any history h ∈ H from stage t ∈ N and
player i ∈ N , the following properties hold:
M1. If Θhi (i) = Good, then the mediator accuses i in
stage t+ 1 with probability P (|Misshi |) = 1− (1− p∗)|Miss
h
i |.
M2. If Θhi (i) = Bad, then the mediator accuses i in stage
t+ 1 with probability 1.
M3. The mediator never accuses i in any stage t′ > t+1.
M4. For any two actions ~ai,~a
′
i ∈ Ai and round r > rnh
from stage t, i is punished in round r either by every node
or by no node, the probability of i being punished is the same
after ~a∗i and ~a
′
i, and every node j ∈ N \ {i} gets the same
key κi.
Proof. M1. Fix any z ∈ Zt succeeding h. By Propo-
sition 4.1, we have Θzi (i) = Good and Miss
z
i = Miss
h
i , and
Θzj (i) = Good for every j 6= i. Thus, no node j sends an ac-
cusation against i to the mediator in the first round of stage
t + 1. Moreover, since nodes never remove entries from RE
and SE, for every sequence S ∈ Misshi , reports relative to i
after z are inconsistent regarding some id ∈ S. If the media-
tor selects S in the corresponding even monitoring round of
stage t+1, then every node sends his reports relative to i and
regarding every event from S, including id. Thus, the medi-
ator detects the inconsistency regarding id and emits an ac-
cusation against i in the last monitoring round of stage t+1.
This occurs with probability P (|Misszi (i)|) = P (|Misshi (i)|).
M2. Fix any z ∈ Zt succeeding h. By Proposition 4.1,
it holds Θzj (i) = Bad for some j 6= i. Hence, j sends an
accusation against i to the mediator in the first monitoring
round of stage t+ 1, and the mediator accuses i in the last
monitoring round of stage t+ 1.
M3. Let t′ ≥ t+ 1 be any stage number and fix any z ∈
Zt′−1 succeeding h. Since i follows ~σf in the first monitoring
round of stage t′, we have Θh
′
i (i) = Good and Miss
h′
i = ∅
for h′ immediately succeeding z. By M1, it follows that the
mediator accuses i in stage t′ + 1 with probability:
P (|Missh′i |) = P (0) = 0.
M4. Regarding the first and last statements, recall that
the mediator is trusted. Hence, we are focusing on any his-
tory h where he has not deviated in the past. Therefore,
whether h precedes the last monitoring round, the medi-
ator always sends the same key κi to every j ∈ N \ {i},
and either sends an accusation to every node or to none.
Regarding the second statement, the mediator ignores any
information sent by i when determining whether i should be
punished. If h ∈ Zt−1, then the probability of i being ac-
cused by the mediator depends solely on Θj(i), recj(i), and
SEj(i) for every j ∈ N \{i}, and on the probability p∗ of the
mediator selecting each sequence of identifiers. Otherwise,
the probability of i being punished depends on the same in-
formation except Θj(i), and depends on what j already sent
to the mediator in previous monitoring rounds of stage t. If
h follows the last monitoring round, then either every node
j ∈ N \{i} already has an accusation against i in h, or none
has, regardless of the present action.
Lemma 4.3 enumerates properties D1-D5. The complete
proof is in Appendix A. Given any history h from stage t,
event e, and node i ∈ N , let gh(e, i) = (e)κi if the mediator
triggers a punishment of i in stage t with key κi, or g
h(e, i) =
e otherwise. By M4, we have that for any j 6= i, if (id, e′) ∈
PEj and j forwards id to i, then j sends g
h(e′, i). Conversely,
if j receives (id, e′) for the first time from i, then j adds
(id, gh(e′, i)) to PEj . For any history h and two actions ~a
∗
i
and ~a′i, we use the notation v
∗
i (i) and v
′
i(i) to represent the
value of any state variable vi resulting from i following ~a
∗
i
and ~a′i after h, respectively. For some j and message ai(j),
we consider that id ∈ ai(j) for some j if there exists a tuple
(id, e) ∈ ai(j).
Properties D1-D3 refer to events introduced only in the
future. Namely, Property D1 states that, regardless of the
punishments being applied, a player i obtains a disseminated
tuple (id, e) iff i is not punished and receives (id, gh(e, j))
from some j. D2 and D3 indicate that i cannot influence
the probability of receiving any event not yet introduced.
Properties D4-D5 refer to events being disseminated. More
precisely, D4 states that if i follows two alternative actions
in which i sends a given identifier id already disseminated
to the same set of nodes, then i receives a tuple containing
id after both actions with the same probability. D5 states
that if the source previously disseminated a tuple (id, e) and
i follows two actions ~a∗i and ~a
′
i where i does not send more
tuples containing id in ~a∗i than in ~a
′
i to any node, then the
probability of i retrieving e after following ~a∗i is at least
as high as after following ~a′i. The complete proofs are in
Appendix A.
Lemma 4.3. Fix any history h ∈ H from stage t ∈ N,
player i ∈ N , and identifier id ∈ {1 . . . ν}. The following
properties hold:
D1. If the source introduces (id, e) after the realisation
of h, then for all history h∗ ∈ H from stage t succeeding h,
player j ∈ N , and (id, e′) ∈ PEh∗j , it holds e′ = gh(e, j).
D2. For every t′ > t and any two actions ~a∗i ,~a
′
i ∈ Ai, the
probability of i receiving some tuple containing identifier id
in stage t′ after i follows ~a∗i is the same as after ~a
′
i.
D3. If id is introduced in stage t after h is realised, then
for any two actions ~a∗i ,~a
′
i ∈ Ai, the probability of i receiving
some tuple containing identifier id in stage t after i follows
~a∗i is the same as after i follows ~a
′
i.
D4. Fix any two actions ~a∗i ,~a
′
i ∈ Ai that fulfil: i) Θ∗i (i) =
Θ′i(i) and Miss
∗
i = Miss
′
i; and ii) for any j ∈ N , id ∈
a∗i (j) iff id ∈ a′i(j). If id is disseminated in stage t before
h is realised, then i receives some tuple containing id after
following ~a∗i iff the same holds after following ~a
′
i.
D5. Let e ∈ E t be the event disseminated with identifier
id. Fix any two actions ~a∗i ,~a
′
i ∈ Ahi that fulfil: i) Θ∗i (i) =
Θ′i(i) and Miss
∗
i = Miss
′
i; and ii) for each j ∈ N , id ∈ a∗i (j)
only if id ∈ a′i(j). For every outcomes z∗, z′ ∈ Zt succeeding
~a∗i and ~a
′
i, respectively, if id is introduced in stage t prior to
h being realised and (id, e) ∈ reci(z′), then (id, e) ∈ reci(z∗).
Proof. (Sketch) D1. The source forwards (id, gh(e, i))
or no tuple containing id to each i. Inductively, if we suppose
that D1 holds for round r, then any j sending (id, e′) to i in
round r + 1 has e′ = gh(gh(e, j), i), while i adds (id, e′′) to
PEi, where e
′′ = gh(e, j). By Commutativity, e′′ = gh(e, i).
D2. We set Θj(j) = Good andMissj = ∅ after first round
of stage t′, and by Proposition 4.1 these values are preserved
throughout stage t′. Thus, every node j forwards id imme-
diately after its first reception to l iff l ∈ SGfj (sdi, id). Since
the probability distribution over seeds is the same after both
actions, then so is the probability of i receiving id.
D3. This probability depends only on the value Θj(j),
Missj , and sdj for every j ∈ N \ {i}: every node follows ~σf
after h, during the dissemination of id; hence, i receives id iff
there exists a path of nodes terminating in i such that every
j in that path forwards id to the next node l, which occurs
when Θj(j) = Good , seq(id) /∈ Missj , and l ∈ SGfi (sdj , id).
By Proposition 4.1, the values Θj(j) and Missj are never
updated after h, regardless of what i does in the present.
If h follows the last monitoring round, then sdj is already
fixed since mediator is trusted, such that i either receives id
after h or not, independently of the current action. Other-
wise, the probability distribution guiding the choice of sdj
is independent of the actions of i.
D4. We use induction to show the result, starting from
the base case that any node j receives id for the first time
immediately after h with the same probability, regardless of
the action of i. Also, by Proposition 4.1, Θj(j) and Missj
are preserved after h for every j ∈ N \ {i}, regardless of the
current action of i. Thus, j either forwards id after h and
after first receiving id to any node l after ~a∗i iff j does the
same after ~a′i. This fact implies the induction step.
D5. We prove two sub-properties. First, we show that,
by not sending more identifiers in ~a∗i , the number of iden-
tifiers being disseminated at each point in time after ~a′i is
a subset of that after ~a∗i , in a similar fashion to D4. Using
this property, we show that, if (id, e) ∈ reci(z′) and i did not
receive (id, e) in h, then it must hold (id, e) ∈ reci(z∗). This
follows from three facts. First, i can never forward (id, e′)
in ~a′i before receiving it while being able retrieve e from e
′,
since otherwise we would have by definition (id, e) /∈ reci(z′).
Second, if i forwards (id, e′) in ~a′i and this tuple loops back
to i, then, despite nodes successively applying ciphers over
e′, i always receives (id, e′) back. Thus, we avoid the sce-
nario where i receives e′ = (e)κi , forwards it causing some
node to decipher e, and expects (id, e) to return to i without
some node ciphering e again. The third fact is the follow-
ing. Suppose that i believes that some tuple (id, e′) is held
by some node j, and that this tuple is forwarded all the way
to i after i follows ~a′i. Suppose also that i can retrieve e
from the event resulting from the successive ciphering oper-
ations applied over e′. Then, the exact same tuple reaches
i when i follows ~a∗i . Here, the fact that nodes deterministi-
cally forward the event received from the node with smallest
identifier plays a key role. More precisely, by the first prop-
erty, the set of identifiers forwarded by any node after ~a∗i
is a subset of the same set after ~a′i. Thus, whenever some
j forwards (id, e′) to l after ~a′i and l prepares to forward e
′
because j has the smallest identifier, then j also forwards
(id, e′) to l and has the smallest identifier after ~a∗i such that
l prepares to forward e′.
Lemma 4.4 enumerates dissemination Properties D6 and
D7, which quantify the probability of node i receiving each
disseminated event. D6 states that this probability is arbi-
trarily close to q(f) for events disseminated in future stages,
which is true by PRNG1. D7 states that for any event with
identifier id introduced in future rounds of the present stage
this probability is at most q(f)+ξ for an arbitrarily small ξ.
This follows from the fact that i learns for each player j 6= i
at most the value SGfj (sdj , id
′) for every id′ previously intro-
duced, but i does not learn these values for id. Hence, any
seed yielding any subset SGfj (sdj , id) is possible and equally
likely to have been chosen by the mediator, independently
of the subsets generated for other events. By Consistency
of (~σf , µf ), i believes this to be true. By PRNG1, it follows
that the probability of any node receiving id is at most ar-
bitrarily close to q(f), although it may be lower due to the
existence of players that drop id.
Lemma 4.4. Fix any player i ∈ N , stage t ∈ N, private
history hi ∈ Hi from stage t, and identifier id ∈ {1 . . . ν}.
The following properties hold:
D6. For every constant ξ > 0 and stage t′ > t, there
exists a function SGi such that i receives some tuple con-
taining identifier id in stage t′ with probability q′ fulfilling
|q′ − q(f)| < ξ.
D7. If id is introduced in stage t after hi is observed,
then for every constant ξ > 0 there exists a function SGi
such that i believes that will receive some tuple containing
identifier id in stage t with probability at most q(f) + ξ.
4.2 Utility Analysis
In line with the One-deviation property, the goal of this
section is to compute the difference between the expected
utilities E~σ
f ,µ(ui|hi,~ai)−E~σf ,µ(ui|hi,~a′i) of player i follow-
ing two alternative actions ~ai and ~a
′
i after any private history
hi. We divide the difference between expected utilities cal-
culated from stage t into three parts: long-term utilities,
referring to any stage t′ > t+1; medium-term utilities rela-
tive to stage t+ 1; and short-term utilities relative to stage
t. We will denote by γ the cost of sending a tuple, i.e.,
γ = α(c+ ⌈log(ν)⌉), where c is the size of an event
4.2.1 Long-term
Lemma 4.5 shows that the expected utility of any stage
t′ > t + 1 is fixed, regardless of the present action in stage
t. The reason for this is that by our definition of strategy,
regardless of what player i does in stage t, he sends every
requested message in stage t′. Also, since he does not deviate
in any future stage, he is never punished in stage t′, receiving
all events with a fixed probability.
Lemma 4.5. Fix any player i ∈ N , private history hi ∈
Hi from stage t ∈ N, and any two actions ~a∗i ,~a′i ∈ Ai. For
every t′ > t+ 1, we have:
E
~σf ,µ,t′(ui|hi,~a∗i ) = E~σ
f ,µ,t′(ui|hi,~a′i).
Proof. By construction, i sets Θi(i) = Good andMissi =
∅ at the beginning of stage t′, regardless of whether i fol-
lows ~a∗i or ~a
′
i. By Proposition 4.1, these variables are never
updated during stage t′. Thus, i always sends every re-
quested monitoring message, implying that expected mon-
itoring costs for stage t′ are the same whether i follows
~a∗i or ~a
′
i. By D2, i receives a tuple with each identifier
id ∈ {1 . . . ν} with the same probability after both actions.
Since Θi(i) = Good and seq(id) /∈ Missi = ∅ after any round
when i receives id for the first time, i forwards a tuple con-
taining id to exactly f nodes with the same probability after
both actions. This implies that expected costs of dissemi-
nating events are the same. Finally, by M3 and M4, in
any dissemination round r of stage t′, no node j ∈ N \ {i}
has an accusation of i. By D1, if i receives (id, e′) from j,
then e′ = gh(e, j) such that i is capable of retrieving e from
e′. Also, i never forwards id before receiving a tuple with
this identifier. Therefore, (id, e) ∈ reci(z) for any z ∈ Zt′
reached with positive probability such that i a tuple con-
taining id in z. By D2, i receives a tuple containing id with
the same probability after following ~a∗i and ~a
′
i. Therefore,
the expected benefits are the same.
4.2.2 Medium-term
Lemma 4.9 analyses the difference between the expected
utility of player i following an action ~a∗i prescribed by the
strategy for dissemination rounds and that of following an
arbitrary action ~a′i. We consider three cases, which cover all
the scenarios of interest to show that ~σf is an equilibrium.
Namely, we have Θ∗i (i) = Θ
hi
i and Miss
∗
i = Miss
hi
i for any
observed hi ∈ Hi such that i follows ~a∗i after hi. This is be-
cause in ~a∗i player i forwards every event as specified by the
strategy and does not send invalid messages. By following
~a′i, imay not update Θi(i) orMissi by following valid actions
only and forwarding every event as expected, may update
Θi(i) from Good to Bad after sending an invalid message, or
add multiple sequences to Missi when not forwarding some
events as expected. However, i may never update Θi(i) from
Bad to Good nor remove an element from Missi.
Lemma 4.6. Fix any player i ∈ N , private history hi ∈ H
from stage t ∈ N, and any two actions ~a∗i ,~a′i ∈ Ai. The fol-
lowing holds regarding the value ∆t+1 = E~σ
f ,t+1(ui|h,~a∗i )−
E
~σf ,t+1(ui|h,~a′i):
1. If Θ∗i (i) = Θ
′
i(i) = Bad, then ∆
t+1 ≥ 0.
2. If Θ∗i (i) = Good and Θ
′
i(i) = Bad, then for any ξ > 0
there exists a function SGfi such that:
∆t+1 ≥ (q(f)− ξ)β(1− P (|Miss∗i |)). (4)
3. If Θ∗i (i) = Θ
′
i(i) = Good, then for any ξ > 0 there
exists a function SGfi such that:
∆t+1 ≥ (q(f)− ξ)β(P (|Miss′i|)− P (|Miss∗i |)). (5)
Proof. Like in the previous lemma, i initialises Θi(i) =
Good and Missi = ∅ in stage t + 1, while never updating
these variables during this stage as stated by Proposition 4.1.
Thus, expected monitoring costs are the same whether i fol-
lows ~a∗i or ~a
′
i. By D2, i receives a tuple for each id ∈ {1 . . . ν}
with a fixed probability independent of the current action,
and forwards id to f nodes. Thus, expected dissemination
costs are also the same after both actions for any case. Now,
we analyse the expected benefits individually for each case.
Case 1. This case is very similar to Lemma 4.5. By
M2, i is punished with probability 1 after both actions. By
construction, if any j 6= i sends (id, e′) to i, then (id, e′′) ∈
PEj where e
′′ = gh(e′, i) = (e′)κi . By D1, e
′′ = gh(e, j),
given that the source introduces (id, e). Thus, for every
(id, e′) sent to i, either we have e′ = (e)κi or ((e)κi)κj for
some j 6= i. By non-disclosure, for any z ∈ Zt+1 reached
with positive probability after any action ~a∗i or ~a
′
i, reci(z) =
∅, such that expected benefits are 0.
Case 2. By M2, i is punished in stage t+1 with probabil-
ity 1 after following ~a′i. As in Case 1, by D1, the expected
benefit is 0. On the other hand, by M1, i is punished in
stage t + 1 after following ~a∗i with probability P (|Miss∗i |).
When i is not being punished, by D1 and D6, i obtains a
benefit β per disseminated event e ∈ E t+1 with probability
at least q(f)− ξ for an arbitrarily small ξ: i receives a tuple
(id, e′) from some j after any history h with probability at
least q(f)−ξ, such that e′ = gh(e, j) and i is able to retrieve
e from e′; thus, for at least a fraction q(f)−ξ of the histories
z ∈ Zt+1 reached with positive probability after ~a∗i or ~a′i, we
have (id, e) ∈ reci(z). Therefore, the expected benefits after
i follows ~a∗i are at least (q(f) − ξ)βν(1− P (|Miss∗i |))/ν, as
we intended to prove.
Case 3. By D1, i retrieves each disseminated event iff
i is not being punished. By M1, the probability of i being
punished after following ~a∗i and ~a
′
i is x
∗ = P (|Miss∗i |) and
x′ = P (|Miss′i|), respectively. By D2 and D6, i receives each
event with some probability q′ ≥ q(f)− ξ for an arbitrarily
small ξ > 0, both after ~a∗i and ~a
′
i. This yields a difference
between the expected benefits given as follows:
(q′βν(1− x∗)− q′βν(1− x′))/ν =
= q′β(x′ − x∗).
This concludes the proof.
4.2.3 Short-term
We need to differentiate between the cases where the al-
ternative actions are followed in dissemination and monitor-
ing rounds, analysed in Lemmas 4.9 and 4.10, respectively.
These lemmas use the following two auxiliary lemmas that
analyse the expected utility relative to events disseminated
in the present stage, after the current round.
Lemma 4.7 shows that the expected benefits of receiving
events disseminated in future rounds are fixed, regardless of
the present action.
Lemma 4.7. Fix any player i ∈ N , history hi ∈ Hi from
stage t ∈ N, id ∈ {1 . . . ν} introduced after hi is observed,
and any two actions ~a∗i ,~a
′
i ∈ Ai. The expected benefits of
receiving e ∈ E t introduced by the source with identifier id
after i follows ~a∗i are the same as after i follows ~a
′
i.
Proof. Fix any h ∈ H such that µ~σf (h|hi) > 0. Fix two
action profiles ~a∗ = (~a∗i ,~a
∗
−i) and ~a
′ = (~a′i,~a
∗
−i), where ~a
∗
−i
corresponds to an action profile prescribed by ~σ∗ immedi-
ately after h, for every player other than i. Let h∗ = (h,~a∗)
and h′ = (h,~a′). By M4, i is either punished in every dissem-
ination round after h∗ and h′ by every node or not punished
by any node. If i is punished, then by D1, for any z ∈ Zt
succeeding h∗ or h′, it holds (id, e) /∈ reci(z). To see this
suppose the opposite. By construction, there exists j that
sends (id, gh(e′, i)) to i in round r such that i is able to re-
trieve e from gh(e′, i). However, since j is following σfj in
round r, it must hold (id, e′) ∈ PEj after round r − 1. By
D1, e′ = gh(e, j). By Non-disclosure, i cannot retrieve e
from gh(e′, i), reaching a contradiction. Therefore, the ex-
pected benefits of receiving events introduced in the future
is 0 when i is being punished after h.
Now, consider that i is not being punished after h. By D3,
the probability of i receiving some tuple (id, e′) when id is
introduced after h is the same after h∗ and h′. By D1, when
some j 6= i sends (id, e′) to i, it holds e′ = gh(gh(e, j), i) =
gh(e, j), since (id, gh(e′, i)) ∈ PEj before j sends (id, e′) to
i. Consequently, i is able to retrieve e from e′, obtaining a
benefit β with the same probability after h∗ and h′. This
implies that expected benefits are the same in this case.
Lemma 4.8 quantifies the difference of the expected costs
of following two alternative actions ~a∗i and ~a
′
i, as a function
of the states resulting from following these actions. Namely,
we first consider the case where ~a∗i and ~a
′
i result in Θ
∗
i (i) =
Θ′i(i) = Bad or Θ
∗
i (i) = Θ
′
i(i) = Good and Miss
∗
i = Miss
′
i.
This covers the scenarios where i sends only valid messages
prescribed by the strategy, except the exact content in each
message may vary. In addition, when Θi(i) = Bad , this
also covers scenarios where i sends invalid messages. Then,
we analyse the case where, in ~a∗i , i forwards every event
as specified by the strategy while, in ~a′i, i fails to forward
some event (Θ∗i (i) = Θ
′
i(i) = Good and Miss
∗
i ⊂ Miss′i).
This is representative of any scenario where ~a∗i is an action
prescribed by the strategy, and ~a′i does not contain invalid
messages but also does not contain some tuple that i was
supposed to forward. Finally, we analyse the case when
i only sends valid messages in ~a∗i and sends some invalid
message in ~a′i, when Θi(i) is initially Good .
Lemma 4.8. Fix any stage t ∈ N, player i ∈ N , history
hi ∈ Hi from stage t, and any two actions ~a∗i ,~a′i ∈ Ai. Re-
garding the difference between the expected costs of forward-
ing events introduced after hi is observed when i follows ~a
∗
i
and when i follows ~a′i, we have:
1. If Θ∗i (i) = Θ
′
i(i) = Bad or Θ
∗
i (i) = Θ
′
i(i) = Good and
Miss∗i = Miss
′
i, then the difference is 0.
2. If Θ∗i (i) = Θ
′
i(i) = Good and Miss
∗
i ⊂ Miss′i, then
for every ξ > 0 there exists a function SGfi such that
the difference is at least −(q(f) + ξ)cnEγf/ν for some
constant c > 0.
3. If Θ∗i (i) = Good and Θ
′
i(i) = Bad, then for every ξ > 0
there exists a function SGfi such that the difference is
at least −(q(f) + ξ)γf .
Proof. Fix any identifier id ∈ {1 . . . ν} introduced after
hi is observed.
Case 1. By Proposition 4.1 and the definition of ~σf , i
forwards id exactly once after its first reception, and only
if Θi(i) = Good . Thus, if Θ
∗
i (i) = Θ
′
i(i) = Bad , then
the expected costs are 0, whether i follows ~a∗i or ~a
′
i. If
Θ∗i (i) = Θ
′
i(i) = Good , then by D3 i receives a tuple con-
taining id after ~a∗i with the same probability as after ~a
′
i. By
Proposition 4.1 and the fact that Miss∗i = Miss
′
i, i forwards
id to exactly f nodes after ~a∗i iff i does so after ~a
′
i. Therefore,
the expected costs are the same.
Case 2. First, suppose that seq(id) ∈ Miss′i \Miss∗i . Af-
ter following ~a′i, i does not forward id. After ~a
∗
i , by D7, i
forwards id with probability at most q(f)+ξ for an arbitrar-
ily small ξ. Since there are at most nE events per sequence
and |Miss′i| − |Miss∗i | ≤ c for some constant c, this yields
a difference of at least −(q(f) + ξ)cnEγf/ν. Now, suppose
seq(id) ∈ Miss∗i ∩Miss′i. By D3, i receives id after ~a∗i and
~a′i with the same probability, in which case i forwards id to
exactly f nodes. Thus, the expected costs of forwarding id
are the same.
Case 3. i does not forward id after ~a′i. By D7, i forwards
id after ~a∗i with probability at most q(f) + ξ. Since there
are at most ν events introduced after hi, this difference is at
least −(q(f) + ξ)νγf/ν.
Lemma 4.9 analyses the difference between the expected
utility of player i following an action ~a∗i prescribed by the
strategy for dissemination rounds, after the observation of
hi, and that of following an arbitrary action ~a
′
i. We con-
sider three cases, which cover all the scenarios relevant to
the proof that ~σf is an equilibrium. By Proposition 4.1, it
holds Θ∗i (i) = Θ
hi
i and Miss
∗
i = Miss
hi
i . Case 1 covers the
scenarios where Θ∗i (i) = Θ
hi
i = Bad , where we always have
Θ′i(i) = Bad , and covers the scenarios where Θ
∗
i (i) = Good
and i sends only valid messages in ~a′i and forwards every
event as requested, implying that Miss′i = Miss
∗
i . Case 2
considers the alternative scenario where Θ∗i (i) = Good , i
only forwards valid messages in ~a′i such that Θ
′
i(i) = Good ,
but i fails to send some identifier id such that seq(id) ∈
Miss′i \Miss∗i . Finally, case 3 analyses the scenario where i
sends some invalid message in ~a′i while Θ
∗
i (i) = Good .
Lemma 4.9. Fix any player i ∈ N , private history hi ∈
H from stage t ∈ N preceding a dissemination round, and
any two actions ~a∗i ,~a
′
i ∈ Ai such that σfi (~a∗i |hi) > 0. The
following holds regarding the value ∆t = E~σ
f ,µ,t(ui|hi,~a∗i )−
E
~σf ,µ,t(ui|hi,~a′i):
1. If Θ∗i (i) = Θ
′
i(i) = Bad or Θ
∗
i (i) = Θ
′
i(i) = Good and
Miss∗i = Miss
′
i, then ∆
t ≥ 0.
2. If Θ∗i (i) = Θ
′
i(i) = Good and Miss
∗
i ⊂ Miss′i, then for
every ξ > 0 there exists a function SGfi and a constant
c > 0 such that:
∆t ≥ −ρ(β + γf)/ν − (q(f) + ξ)cnEγf/ν.
3. If Θ∗i (i) = Good and Θ
′
i(i) = Bad, then for every
ξ > 0 there exists a function SGfi such that:
∆t ≥ −ρ(β + γf)/ν − (q(f) + ξ)γf.
Proof. Fix h ∈ H such that µ~σ(h|hi) > 0, ~a∗ = (~a∗i ,~a∗−i),
~a′ = (~a′i,~a
∗
−i), h
∗ = (h,~a∗), and h′ = (h,~a′), such that ~a∗−i is
prescribed by ~σf for every player other than i. We analyse
each case separately.
Case 1. By Lemmas 4.7 and 4.8, expected costs and bene-
fits relative to events introduced after hi are the same. Now,
we analyse costs and benefits of events introduced before hi.
Fix a tuple (id, e) introduced before h. If Θ∗i (i) = Bad , then
i does not forward id in ~a∗i . Else, for any j, id ∈ a∗i (j)
iff seq(id) /∈ Misshi , j ∈ SGfi (sdi, id), and i has received
id for the first time in the previous round. In this case,
it must hold id ∈ a∗i (j) only if id ∈ a′i(j). To see this,
suppose that id ∈ a∗i (j) and id /∈ a′i(j). This would im-
ply seq(id) ∈ Miss′i \Miss∗i , which would contradict case 1.
By D5, i obtains a benefit β for receiving (id, e) after h′ only
if i obtains that benefit after h∗. Thus, expected benefits
relative to (id, e) after i follows ~a∗i are at least as high as
those after ~a′i.
The expected costs of forwarding id depend on whether i
forwards id in ~a∗i and ~a
′
i, or forwards id after these actions
are taken. We have seen that, for each j 6= i, id ∈ a∗i (j)
only if id ∈ a′i(j). Thus, costs of following ~a′i are at least as
high as those of following ~a∗i . First, suppose that seq(id) ∈
Miss∗i = Miss
′
i or Θ
∗
i (i) = Θ
′
i(i) = Bad . By Proposition 4.1,
i does not forward id after h∗ and h′. Therefore, expected
costs of forwarding id after h∗ and h′ are both 0.
Now, consider that seq(id) /∈ Miss∗i = Miss′i and Θ′i(i) =
Θ∗i (i) = Good . By Proposition 4.1 and the definition of ~σ
f ,
i forwards id to f nodes after its first reception, both after
h∗ and h′. It must hold for every j 6= i that id ∈ a∗i (j) iff
id ∈ a′i(j). To see this, first suppose that id ∈ a∗i (j) and
id /∈ ai(j)′ for some j. By definition of σfi , seq(id) /∈ Miss∗i ,
which implies that i received id for the first time in the pre-
vious round and j ∈ SGfi (sdi, id). But in this case we would
have seq(id) ∈ Miss′i \Miss∗i . Now, suppose that id /∈ a∗i (j)
and id ∈ a′i(j). Again, seq(id) /∈ Miss∗i . Thus, either
j /∈ SGfi (sdi, id) or i did not receive id in the previous round.
Either way, we would have seq(id) ∈ Miss′i \ Miss∗i . Both
situations contradict the assumption that Miss∗i = Miss
′
i.
Therefore, we can apply D4 to conclude that i receives id
for the first time and forwards it after h∗ with the same
probability as after h′. Consequently, expected costs of for-
warding id after h∗ and h′ are the same.
Cases 2 and 3. By Lemmas 4.7 and 4.8, the difference
between the expected utilities for receiving and disseminat-
ing events introduced after h for cases 2 and 3 is at least
−(q(f)+ ξ)cnEγf/ν and −(q(f)+ ξ)γf , respectively. There
are at most ρ events introduced in h. In the worst scenario,
when following ~a∗i , i does not retrieve any of those events
while forwarding all of them, resulting in the minimum ex-
pected difference of −ρ(β + γf)/ν.
In Lemma 4.9, we consider alternative actions ~a∗i and ~a
′
i
followed in a monitoring round, where ~a∗i is prescribed by
σfi . Since we never update Missi in a monitoring round, we
only need to consider the resulting values of Θ∗i (i) and Θ
′
i(i).
By Proposition 4.1, we always have Θhii = Θ
∗
i (i), where hi
is the private history preceding ~a∗i . If Θ
∗
i (i) = Bad , then
Θ′i(i) = Bad . Else, we have Θ
′
i(i) = Good iff i sends all
the required monitoring messages and only valid messages.
These two scenarios are captured by case 1 of the lemma.
Case 2 encompasses the other scenario where Θ∗i (i) = Good
and i sends some invalid message or fails to send a requested
message in ~a′i.
Lemma 4.10. Fix any player i ∈ N , private history hi ∈
H from stage t ∈ N preceding a monitoring round, and any
two actions ~a∗i ,~a
′
i ∈ Ai. The following holds regarding the
value ∆t = E~σ
f ,µ,t(ui|hi,~a∗i )− E~σ
f ,µ,t(ui|hi,~a′i):
1. If Θ∗i (i) = Θ
′
i(i), then ∆
t ≥ 0.
2. If Θ∗i (i) = Good and Θ
′
i(i) = Bad, then for every
ξ > 0 there exists a function SGfi such that:
∆t ≥ −nα∗(1 + nSp∗)/ν − (q(f) + ξ)γf.
Proof. Fix h ∈ H such that µ~σ(h|hi) > 0, ~a∗ = (~a∗i ,~a∗−i),
~a′ = (~a′i,~a
∗
−i), h
∗ = (h,~a∗), and h′ = (h,~a′), where ~a∗−i is
prescribed by ~σf for every player other than i. We analyse
each case separately.
Case 1. First, consider that Θ∗i (i) = Θ
′
i(i) = Bad . By
definition of σfi and Proposition 4.1, i does not send mes-
sages in ~a∗i nor after h
∗ and h′. Thus, expected costs are
at least as high when following ~a′i as when following ~a
′
i. By
Lemma 4.7, expected benefits are the same after h∗ and
h′. Now, suppose Θ∗i (i) = Θ
′
i(i) = Good . Since this is a
monitoring round, it holds Miss∗i = Miss
′
i = ∅. By Lem-
mas 4.7 and 4.8, expected benefits and costs of receiving
and forwarding events are the same after h∗ and h′. By
Proposition 4.1, i forwards every requested monitoring mes-
sage after h∗ and h′. Since mediator requests each report
with fixed probability p∗, expected monitoring costs are the
same. Finally, i sends at least as many messages in ~a′i as in
~a∗i , implying that ∆
t ≥ 0.
Case 2. Lemmas 4.7 and 4.8 imply that the contribution
of the expected benefits and costs of dissemination to ∆t
is at least −(q(f) + ξ)γf . Regarding monitoring, i sends
in ~a∗i all requested messages, which cost at most nα
∗. By
Proposition 4.1 and the definition of σfi , i does not send any
monitoring message after h′, and sends an expected number
of nnSp∗ messages after h∗: for each node j, i sends reports
to the mediator per sequence of identifiers with independent
probability p∗; thus, i sends reports relative to j regarding
an expected number of sequences nSp∗. This adds at least
the value −nα∗(1 + nSp∗)/ν to ∆t.
4.3 Main Result
We now prove our main result. First, we establish suffi-
cient conditions on the parameters nE, nS, and p∗. Then,
we prove that (~σf , µf ) is a SE. We conclude the section by
proving our central claim.
4.3.1 Conditions on Parameters
The following conditions on nE, nS, and p∗ are sufficient
for our purposes:
C1. nE log(ν) = o(ν).
C2. p∗ log(ν) = o(1).
C3. p∗ν = Ω(nE).
C4. For some constant c > 0, limν→∞(1− p∗)nS = c.
C1 and C2 are required for keeping the expected moni-
toring costs sub-linear on ν. C3 and C4 guarantee that the
immediate gain of deviating does not out-weigh the future
loss of being punished. One definition that fulfils all condi-
tions is nE = nS =
√
ν and p∗ = 1/
√
ν.
4.3.2 Equilibria Existence
In Theorem 4.11, we show that, for any fanout f > 0,
(~σf , µf ) is Sequentially Rational, as long as δ and ν are
sufficiently large and the benefit β per received event is suf-
ficiently larger than the cost γf of forwarding each event to
f nodes. Since (~σf , µf ) is consistent by definition, it fol-
lows that (~σf , µf ) is a SE. In the proof, we use the fact
that α∗ = 4αnE log(ν), shown as follows. α∗ comprises the
cost of i sending to the mediator 2nE reports from SEi(j)
and REi(j). Each report has a round and event identifier,
corresponding to 2 log(ν) bits.
Theorem 4.11. For every f > 0, there exist constants
c > 0, δ¯ ∈ (0, 1), and ν¯ ∈ N, such that, for every δ ∈
(δ¯, 1) and ν > ν¯, if β > cγf , then (~σf , µf ) is Sequentially
Rational.
Proof. We use the One-deviation Property to show the
result. More precisely, we fix any player i ∈ N and hi ∈ Hi
from any stage t, and we calculate, for any actions ~a∗i ,~a
′
i ∈
Ai such that σfi (~a∗i |hi) > 0, the value:
∆ = E~σ
f ,µf (ui|hi,~a∗i )− E~σ
f ,µf (ui|hi,~a′i).
The goal is to prove that ∆ ≥ 0 for ν and δ sufficiently large.
We have ∆ =
∑∞
t′=t δ
t′−t∆t
′
, where:
∆t
′
= E~σ
f ,µf ,t′(ui|hi,~a∗i )− E~σ
f ,µf ,t′(ui|hi,~a′i).
By Lemma 4.5, it holds ∆t
′
= 0 for every t′ > t+1, thus, we
have ∆ = ∆t + δ∆t+1. We need to compute ∆ for the cases
where hi precedes monitoring and dissemination rounds.
Monitoring Round. When Θ′i(i) = Θ
∗
i (i), ∆ ≥ 0 by 1
of Lemmas 4.6 and 4.10. Else, by 2 of the same lemmas, we
have for an arbitrarily small ξ > 0:
∆ ≥ −nα∗(1 + nSp∗)/ν − (q(f) + ξ)γf + δ(q(f)− ξ)β.
Since nSnE = ν, by C1 and C2:
nα∗(1 + nSp∗)/ν = 4nαnE log(ν)(1 + nSp∗)/ν
= O(p∗ log(ν) + nE log(ν)/ν) = o(1).
Therefore, for ν sufficiently large, there exists ǫ arbitrarily
small such that:
∆ ≥ q(f)(δβ − γf)− ǫ.
If β > γf and δ is sufficiently large, then ∆ ≥ 0.
Dissemination Round. We need to consider the three
cases where: 1) Θ∗i (i) = Θ
′
i(i) = Good and Miss
∗
i = Miss
′
i
or Θ∗i (i) = Θ
′
i(i) = Bad ; 2) Θ
′
i(i) = Θ
∗
i (i) = Good and
Miss∗i ⊂ Miss′i; and 3) Θ∗i (i) = Good and Θ′i(i) = Bad .
Case 1. By 1) of Lemmas 4.6 and 4.9, ∆ ≥ 0.
Case 2. By 2) of Lemmas 4.6 and 4.9, we have for some
constant c and an arbitrarily small ξ > 0:
∆ ≥ −o(ν)/ν − (q(f) + ξ)c(nE/ν)γf+
+δ(q(f)− ξ)β(P (x′)− P (x∗)),
where x∗ = |Miss∗i | and x′ = |Miss′i|. Since x′ − x∗ ≥ 1:
P (x′)− P (x∗) ≥
≥ (1− (1− p∗)x∗+1)− (1− (1− p∗)x∗) =
= p∗(1− p∗)x∗ ≥ p∗(1− p∗)nS .
If ν is sufficiently large, then for an arbitrarily small ǫ:
∆ ≥ q(f)(δβp∗(1− p∗)nS − c(nE/ν)γf)− ǫ.
If we divide both sides by k = p∗(1 − p∗)nS , then by C3
and C4, there exists c′ > 0 such that for an arbitrarily small
ǫ > 0:
∆/k ≥ q(f)(δβ − c′γf)− ǫ.
If β > c′γf , then for δ sufficiently close to 1 and ǫ sufficiently
small we have ∆ ≥ 0.
Case 3. By 3) of Lemmas 4.6 and 4.9, for an arbitrarily
small ξ > 0:
∆ ≥ −o(ν)/ν − (q(f) + ξ)γf + δ(q(f)− ξ)β(1− P (x∗)),
where x∗ = |Miss∗i |. Since 1−P (x∗) ≥ (1−p∗)n
S
, as in case
2), there exists a constant c > 0 such that for an arbitrarily
small ǫ:
∆ ≥ q(f)(δβ − cγf) − ǫ.
If β > cγf , for δ sufficiently close to 1, it holds ∆ ≥ 0.
4.3.3 Central Claim
We conclude with the proof of Theorem 2.3. The result
follows trivially for f = q(f) = 0. Thus, fix any f > 0. We
have already defined a monitoring mechanism and a pair
(~σf , µf ) that is a SE of the induced game, as long as δ and
ν are sufficiently large, and β = Ω(γf). By M1, M3, and D6,
the expected utility of forwarding and receiving events per
stage is u˜(f) fulfilling |u˜(f) − u¯(f)| < ǫ for an arbitrarily
small ǫ. This yields an average utility of:
(1− δ)
∞∑
t=0
δt(−A/ν + u˜(f)) = −A/ν + u˜(f),
where A ≤ nα∗(1+p∗nS). By C1 and C2, we have A = o(ν).
For ν sufficiently large, A/ν is arbitrarily small, and the
average utility is arbitrarily close to u¯(f).
5. DISCUSSION
The main step towards improving our result lies in dis-
tributing the role of the mediator, possibly having a differ-
ent mediator per node. This goal poses two main challenges:
1) how to ensure that every node agrees on whether to pun-
ish any i and on the key κi; and 2) how to distribute the
seeds. The first challenge can be addressed by having nodes
reaching an agreement regarding the set of punishments and
keys for each stage, in a similar fashion to [8]. The second
challenge can be addressed using techniques similar to those
from [2], by having nodes committing to random numbers
without revealing each seed sdi to any node other than i.
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APPENDIX
A. CORRECTNESS PROOFS
Proof of Lemma 4.3
D1. We use induction to show that the property holds
for every history h′ = h or succeeding h, and preceding h∗.
For the base case, we have h′ = h. Since id has not been
disseminated prior to h, no node j has id in PEj . For the
induction step, suppose that D1) holds for some history h′,
and fix any j. If (id, e′) ∈ PEh′j , then the result follows
by the hypothesis. If j is the source and disseminates id
when h′ is observed, then only j adds (id, e) to PEj after
h′. Else, consider that j receives (id, e′) from l ∈ N . By the
hypothesis, we have e′ = gh(gh(e, l), j), and j adds (id, e′′) to
PEj with e
′′ = gh(e′, l). By Commutativity, e′′ = gh(e, j).
D2. Let ~a∗ = (~a∗i ,~a−i) and ~a
′ = (~a′i,~a−i) be the action
profiles followed after h when players different from i abide
to ~σf . Fix any two histories h∗ and h′ from stage t′, imme-
diately preceding the last monitoring round of stage t′, and
succeeding (h,~a∗) and (h,~a′), respectively. By the fact that
we initialise Θj(j) = Good and Missj = ∅ in stage t′, and
by Proposition 4.1, it holds Θh
∗
j (j) = Θ
h′
j (j) = Good and
Missh
∗
j = Miss
h′
j = ∅ for every j ∈ N . Thus, j abides to ~σf
throughout stage t′ by forwarding a tuple containing id once
after its first reception, to the f nodes from SGfj (sdj , id).
Thus, if the selection of seeds after h∗ is the same as after
h′, then i receives a tuple containing id after h∗ iff i receives
id after h′. Since the probability distribution of the selection
of seeds is the same after h∗ and h′, the result follows.
D3. Let ~a∗ = (~a∗i ,~a−i) and ~a
′ = (~a′i,~a−i) be the ac-
tion profiles followed after h when players different from i
abide to ~σf . First, suppose that h precedes a dissemination
round. Since the mediator is trusted, regardless of the ac-
tion followed by i, the value of sdj is fixed for every j ∈ N .
If j 6= i, then by Proposition 4.1 whether i follows ~a∗i or
~a′i the values Θj(j) and Missj in any dissemination round
are equal to Θhj (j) and Miss
h
j , respectively. Therefore, the
behaviour of j after i follows ~a∗i is the same as after i fol-
lows ~a′i: j either forwards id after its reception according to
SGfj (sdj , id), or j does not forward id to any node. Thus, i
receives a tuple containing id after following ~a∗i iff i receives
id after following ~a′i. Now, suppose that h precedes a moni-
toring round and let h∗ and h′ be any histories immediately
preceding the last monitoring round and succeeding (h,~a∗)
and (h,~a′), respectively. As in Property D2, for the same
selections of seeds after h∗ and h′, i receives id after h∗ iff
i receives id after h′. Since the probability distribution over
the seeds is the same, i receives id with the same probability.
D4. Let ~a∗ = (~a∗i ,~a−i) and ~a
′ = (~a′i,~a−i) be the action
profiles followed after h when players different from i abide
to ~σf . i receives id in (h,~a∗) iff the same holds in (h′,~a′).
Now, we show using induction that, for every j 6= i and
histories h∗ and h′ succeeding or equal to (h,~a∗) and (h,~a′)
respectively: 1) j receives id in h∗ iff j receives id in h′;
and 2) j forwards id immediately after h∗ iff j forwards id
immediately after h′. This proves that i receives id after ~a∗
iff i receives id after ~a′.
Base case. 1) holds if j receives id in h. Otherwise, j re-
ceives id in ~a∗ iff j receives id in ~a′, proving 1). By construc-
tion, Θh
∗
j (j) = Θ
h′
j and Miss
h∗
j = Miss
h′
j . This means that
j has Θh
∗
j (j) = Bad or seq(id) ∈ Missh
∗
i iff Θ
h′
j (j) = Bad
or seq(id) ∈ Missh′i . This implies that j forwards id imme-
diately after h∗ iff the same holds after h′, proving 2).
Induction step. Consider that the hypothesis holds for
any h∗ and h′. It holds that j receives id in h∗ iff j receives
id in h′, implying 1. In this case, j does not forward id one
round after h∗ and h′, which implies 2). Now, by 2) of the
hypothesis, j first receives id from some l after h∗ iff j first
receives id from l after h′, proving 1). By Proposition 4.1,
Θh
∗
j (j) = Θ
h′
j (j) and Miss
h∗
j = Miss
h′
j , proving 2).
D5. Fix any z∗ and z′. Let ~a∗ = (~a∗i ,~a−i) and ~a
′ =
(~a′i,~a−i) be the action profiles immediately following h in z
∗
and z′, respectively. i receives (id, e′) in (h,~a∗) iff i receives
(id, e′) in (h,~a′), whether i can retrieve e from e′. Thus, if
(id, e) ∈ reci(z′) because i received (id, e′) in (h,~a′), then it
also holds (id, e) ∈ reci(z∗).
Now, suppose that for all (id, e′) received in (h,~a′) and
(h,~a∗) it holds that i cannot retrieve e from e′. Suppose also
that (id, e) ∈ reci(z′). Here, some j 6= i sends (id, e′′) to i af-
ter (h,~a′) such that i can retrieve e from e′′ or gh(e′′, j). This
occurs after some history h¯, such that (id, e′) ∈ PEh¯j with
e′ = gh(e′′, i), and i is able to retrieve e from gh(gh(e′, j), i).
In this case, we say that i can retrieve e from e′ in j.
We prove two sub-properties. First, we show using induc-
tion that, for any histories h′ and h∗ succeeding or equal to
(h,~a′)′ and (h,~a∗) respectively, any j 6= i forwards id imme-
diately after h∗ only if j forwards id immediately after or in
h′. Then, we use this fact to prove through induction that,
for any histories h′ and h∗ succeeding (h,~a′) and (h,~a∗) re-
spectively, and any j 6= i, if i can retrieve e from e′ in j then:
1) (id, e′) ∈ PEh′j only if (id, e′) ∈ PEh
∗
j ; and 2) j forwards
(id, e′) one round after h′ only if j forwards (id, e′) one round
after h∗. Given that these properties hold, i receives (id, e′)
from any j after (h,~a′) only if i receives (id, e′) from j after
(h,~a′). Thus, if (id, e) ∈ rec− i(z′), then (id, e) ∈ reci(z∗).
Property 1. Base case. It is true that if j has received
id in h, then j never forwards id after (h,~a∗) and (h,~a′). In
addition, j receives id in ~a∗ for the first time only if j receives
id in ~a′ for the first time. That is, j receives id from any
l 6= i in ~a∗ iff the same holds in ~a′, whereas j never receives
id in ~a∗ from i while not receiving it from i in ~a′. By the
preservation of Θj(j) and Missj , it holds that j forwards id
immediately after ~a∗ only if j forwards id after ~a′.
Induction step. Suppose the hypothesis holds for two his-
tories h∗ and h′. Let h1 = (h∗,~a1) ∈ z∗ and (h′,~a2) ∈ z′
be the histories immediately succeeding h∗ and h′, respec-
tively. Fix any j 6= i. If j already received and forwarded
id in h1, then by the hypothesis j already forwarded id in
h2, and does not forward id after h2. Now, consider that
j receives id for the first time immediately after h∗, and
forwards id immediately after h1. By construction, it must
hold that Θh
1
j (j) = Good and seq(id) /∈ Missh
1
j . By Propo-
sition 4.1, Θh
1
j (j) = Θ
h2
j (j) and Miss
h1
j = Miss
h2
j . By the
hypothesis, either j forwarded id to j in h2 or j receives id
immediately after h′. In the former case, the result follows.
In the latter case, since we also have Θh
2
j (j) = Good and
seq(id) /∈ Missh2j , j forwards id immediately after h2. This
proves the result.
Property 2. Base case. Suppose j receives (id, e′′) from
l with e′′ = gh(e′, l), such that l is the node with the smallest
identifier among the nodes sending id to i in ~a′, and adds
(id, e′) to PEh
′
j . We cannot have l = i, or else i sends (id, e
′′)
to j before receiving this tuple and such that i can retrieve
e from e′′, implying that (id, e) /∈ reci(z′). Therefore, l also
sends (id, e′′) to j in ~a∗. The set of nodes sending (id, e′′) to
j in ~a∗ is a subset of those that send id in ~a′. Thus, j also
receives (id, e′′) from l, l also has the smallest identifier, and
j adds (id, e′) to PEh
∗
j , proving the base case.
Induction step. Suppose the hypothesis holds for h′ and
h∗. Let h1 = (h∗,~a1) ∈ z∗ and (h′,~a2) ∈ z′ be the histo-
ries immediately succeeding h∗ and h′, respectively. Fix any
j 6= i and e′ such that i can retrieve e from e′ in j. By the hy-
pothesis, if (id, e′) ∈ PEh′j , then (id, e′) ∈ PEh
∗
j ; if j forwards
id immediately after h′, then j forwards id immediately af-
ter h∗. Either way, j does not forward id after h1 and h2,
proving the result. Now, suppose that (id, e′) /∈ PEh′j and
that j receives id for the first time immediately after h′ from
a set of nodes S′. Let l ∈ S′ be the node with the smallest
identifier, which may be i.
If l sends (id, e′′) with e′′ 6= gh(e′, l), then j never adds
(id, e′) to PEj and never forwards this tuple after h
′. Oth-
erwise, (id, e′) ∈ PEh2j and (id, e1) ∈ PEh
′
l , where e
1 =
gh(e′′, j). Since i can retrieve e from e′ in j, i can retrieve
e from e1 in l: i can retrieve e from gh(e2, i) where e2 =
gh(e′, j); by Commutativity, we have e1 = gh(gh(e′, l), j) =
gh(e2, l); thus, i can retrieve e from gh(gh(e1, l), i) = gh(e2, i).
Therefore, we can apply 2 of the hypothesis to conclude that
(id, e2) ∈ PEh∗l , and l also sends (id, e′′) immediately after
h∗ to j. Let S∗ be the set of nodes sending id to j imme-
diately after h∗. It must hold that j receives id for the first
time after h∗, or else we would reach a contradiction with
Property 1): if j had received id in h∗, then he would also
have received id in h′, contradicting the supposition that j
receives id for the first time after h′. It thus follows from
Property 1) that, if any node x sends id to i immediately
after h∗, then x sends id immediately after h′, i.e., S∗ ⊆ S′.
Since l ∈ S∗, l is the node with the smallest identifier in S∗.
Thus, j adds (id, e′) to PEh
1
j , proving 1. In this case, by
Proposition 4.1, Missh
∗
j = Miss
h′
j and Θ
h∗
j (j) = Θ
h′
j (j), and
j forwards id immediately after h1 iff j forwards id after h2.
This proves the result.
Proof of Lemma 4.4 Properties D6) and D7) fol-
low from Lemmas C.1 and C.2, respectively, proven in Ap-
pendix C.
B. PSEUDO RANDOM NUMBER GENER-
ATOR
We consider a pseudo-random number generator function
defined as follows. The definition used in [2] considers a
pseudo-random number generator function G defined as a
sequence of m(k) > k bits generated from a seed s ∈ {0, 1}k
for some security parameter k. G is said to be a pseudo-
random number generator if no probabilistic time machine
can distinguish between the outcome of G and truly random
sequences of bits. We formalise this intuition in a way that
is useful for our purposes as follows. For all ξ > 0 and
polynomial m, there exists k such that for every sequence of
bits ~b ∈ {0, 1}m(k): ∣∣∣∣ 12m(k) −
|S|
2k
∣∣∣∣ < ξ, (6)
where S is the largest set of seeds such that for every s ∈ S
we have ~b = G(s).
For each i ∈ N , we define SGfi from G as follows. Let
x =
(
n−1
f
)
be the number of different subsets of nodes to
whom i may send any event. We letm(k) = ν ·φ(k)·⌈log(x)⌉
for some polynomial φ(k). Any generated stream repre-
sents a sequence of ν numbers. Given the id-th number b,
SGfi (sdi, id) returns the y-th subset, where y ≡ b (mod x).
By the definition of G, the probability of selecting a partic-
ular sequence of numbers is arbitrarily close to 1/xν , shown
as follows. By using the modulo operation, we ensure that
there exist two integers (d, r) such that: i) r ∈ {0 . . . x− 1};
ii) m(k) = xd+ r; iii) r subsets of each id are mapped into
d + 1 numbers; and iv) x − r subsets are mapped into d
numbers. The probability of each sequence of subsets being
selected is arbitrarily close to selecting for each id a number
that yields the corresponding subset. Since for each id and
subset, there are d or d + 1 different numbers yielding that
subset, by 6, the probability of selecting each subset is ei-
ther arbitrarily close to d/m(k) or (d+ 1)/m(k). Thus, the
probability of selecting the sequence is arbitrarily close to a
value lying in the interval:((
d
xd+ r
)ν
,
(
d+ 1
xd+ r
)ν)
.
By taking the limit φ(k) → ∞, we also have d → ∞, and
the probability of each sequence of subsets being selected
converges to 1/xν . Thus, SGfi fulfils Property PRNG1 as
shown by Proposition B.1. Here, we can adjust the constant
ξ by adjusting k and φ(k).
Proposition B.1. Fix any node i ∈ N and sequence of
subsets ~S = (Sid)id∈{1...ν} with Sid ⊆ N \ {i} and |Sid| = f
for every id ∈ {1 . . . ν}. For any constant ξ > 0, there exist
k and φ(k) such that for every id ∈ {1 . . . ν}:∣∣∣∣∣P SG
f
i (~S|~S−id)− 1(n−1
f
)
∣∣∣∣∣ ≤ ξ.
Proof. Fix any ξ > 0. By the definition of SGfi , we can
define k and φ(k) such that:
|1/xν − P SGfi (~S)| < ξ, (7)
where P SG
f
i (~S) = #S/2k is the probability of selecting a
seed such that SGfi yields
~S. We can write:
P SG
f
i (~S|~S−id) = a/b = (a/2k)/(b/2k) = P SG
f
i (~S)/P SG
f
i (~S−id),
where a is the number of seeds that yield ~S, and b is the
number of seeds that yield ~S−id, independently of Sid. In
particular, by 6, we can define SGfi such that:
P SG
f
i (~S−id) =
=
∑
S′
id
⊆N\{i}:|S′
id
|=f P
SG
f
i (S′id, ~S−id) >
>
∑
S′
id
⊆N\{i}:|S′
id
|=f (1/x
ν − ξ) = x ∗ (1/xν − ξ).
Similarly:
P SG
f
i (~S−id) < x ∗ (1/xν + ξ).
Therefore, we can write:
P SG
f
i (~S)/P SG
f
i (~S−id) >
> (1/xν − ξ)/(x(1/xν + ξ)) =
= 1/(x(1 + xνξ))− ξxν/(x(1 + xνξ)) =
= 1/x − 2ξxν/(x(1 + xνξ)).
Thus, we can define SGfi such that for an arbitrarily small
ξ′ > 0 it holds P SG
f
i (~S)/P SG
f
i (~S−id) > 1/x − ξ′. Using
an identical reasoning, we can also define k and φ(k) such
that P SG
f
i (~S)/P SG
f
i (~S−id) < 1/x + ξ
′. This shows that
|P SGfi (~S|~S−id) − 1/x| < ξ′ for an arbitrarily small ξ′, as
we intended to prove.
C. DISSEMINATION MODEL
For any fanout f , the reliability of dissemination q(f)
is the probability of any node i receiving an event, and
is determined using a model similar to the SIR model [1].
More precisely, the source introduces e ∈ E t with iden-
tifier id in round r∗ = id + τM − 1 of stage t. In ev-
ery round r, Qid,f (S, I,R, r) is the probability that nodes
from the set S have received and forwarded a message con-
taining id by round r, I contains the nodes that received
a message containing id and will forward it in the next
round, and R contains the nodes that have not received id,
such that (S, I,R) forms a partition of N . This probabil-
ity is defined recursively as Qid,f (∅, ∅,N , r) = 1 for r < r∗,
Qid,f (∅, {s},N \ {s}, r∗) = 1, where s is the source, and for
any r > r∗, partition (S, I,R), and I ′ ⊆ R:
Qid,f (S, I,R, r + 1) =
=
∑
I′⊆S Q
id,f (S \ I ′, I ′, R ∪ I, r)P id,f (I |I ′, R),
where P id,f (I |I ′, R) is the probability of exactly all nodes in
I among R∪I receiving a dissemination message containing
id from some node in I , given that each node forwards id to
a subset of f neighbours chosen uniformly at random. The
dissemination ends in round r = τM + id+ ρ. Then, q(f) is
the probability of any node i receiving id during the present
stage and is defined as:
q(f) =
∑
S⊆N :i∈S
Qid,f (S, ∅,N \ S, r). (8)
C.1 Auxiliary Proofs
We show that disseminating events using the pseudo-random
number generator approximates the dissemination model for
any fanout f . Namely, for each partition (S, I,R) of N , we
denote byHid,t(S, I,R, r) the set of histories h of stage t such
that rnh = r and S equals to the set of nodes that already
received id, while I is the set of nodes that will forward id
in the next round:
S = {j ∈ N|∃r′∃o∈N\{j}(id, r′) ∈ REhj (o)}.
I = {j ∈ N \ S|∃e∈E(id, e) ∈ PEhj }.
Lemma C.1 demonstrates that every player i expects every
event to be disseminated in an approximate fashion to the
dissemination model corresponding to any fanout, in future
stages.
Lemma C.1. Fix any fanout f , stage t ∈ N, terminal his-
tory z ∈ Zt, player i ∈ N , and identifier id ∈ {1 . . . ν}. For
every r ∈ {τM + id− 1 . . . τ}, ξ > 0, and partition (S, I,R)
of N such that i ∈ R, there exists a function SGfi such that:
∣∣∣∣∣∣
∑
h∈Hid,t+1(S,I,R,r)
P ~σ
f
(h|z)−Qid,f (S, I,R, r)
∣∣∣∣∣∣ ≤ ξ. (9)
Proof. We show the hypothesis using induction on r.
Base case. We have r = τM + id − 1. Fix any h ∈ H
such that P ~σ
f
(h|z) > 0 with rnh = r. By construction, we
have (id, e) ∈ PEhs , with s being the source and e the event
disseminated with identifier id. Since no other node dissem-
inates events, it holds that Hid(∅, {s},N \ {s}, r) includes
every history leading to round r. Thus, it holds:
∑
h∈Hid,t(∅,{s},N\{s},r)
P ~σ
f
(h|z) = 1 = Qid,f (∅, {s},N \{s}, r).
This proves the base case.
Induction step. Suppose that the hypothesis holds for
some r. By construction, we have Θhi (i) = Good andMiss
h
i =
∅ for every i ∈ N and history h with rnh = r. Fix any his-
tory h1 immediately preceding the last monitoring round of
stage t+1. For any partition (S, I,R) and h ∈ Hid,t(S, I,R, r)
succeeding h1, there exists exactly one history h∗ per set
I ′ ⊆ R succeeding h where exactly the nodes from I ′ receive
id from some node in I after h:
h∗ ∈ Hid,t(S ∪ I, I ′, R \ I ′, r + 1).
For each such I ′, it holds:
∪j∈I SGfj (sdhj , id) \ S = I ′. (10)
Since seeds are determined in the last monitoring round, if
we add over every h ∈ Hid(S, I,R, r) where nodes of I to
exactly select nodes from I ′, then we are adding over all the
seeds selected by the mediator for nodes in I after h1, such
that 10 holds. By PRNG1, when every seed is generated
independently and uniformly at random, the probability of
such even occurring is arbitrarily close to that when nodes
in I select the subset of neighbours to whom they forward
the event uniformly at random. The latter event occurs with
probability P id,f (I ′|I,R). That is, an approximate fraction
P id,f (I ′|I,R) of the histories from Hid,t(S, I,R, r) has nodes
from I selecting those from I . By the hypothesis, for each
I ′, there exists SGi such that:∑
h∈Hid,t(S∪I,I′,R\I′,r+1) P
~σf (h|h1) ≈
≈ ∑h∈Hid,t+1(S,I,R,r) P ~σf (h|h1)P id,f (I ′|I,R) ≈
≈ Qid,f (S, I,R, r)P id,f (I ′|I,R) =
= Qid,f (S ∪ I, I ′, R \ I ′, r + 1).
Since this holds for any h1, the result follows.
Lemma C.2. Fix any fanout f , stage t ∈ N, player i ∈ N ,
private history hi ∈ Hi, and identifier id ∈ {1 . . . ν} not yet
introduced by the source in hi. For every r ∈ {τM + id −
1 . . . τ}, ξ > 0, and partition (S, I,R) of N such that i ∈ R,
there exists a function SGfi such that:∑
h∈Hid,t(S,I,R,r)
P ~σ
f ,µ(h|hi)−Qid,f (S, I,R, r) ≤ ξ. (11)
Proof. The proof is identical to Lemma C.1, except that
now i has acquired some knowledge regarding the outputs
of SGfj for each j 6= i, after the observation of hi.
Base case. Identical to Lemma C.1.
Induction step. Suppose that the hypothesis holds for
some r. For any partition (S, I,R), fix any h ∈ Hid,t(S, I,R, r)
such that P ~σ
f ,µ(h|hi) > 0, and fix any I ′ ⊆ R. Fix ~S =
(Sj
id′
), with one subset Sj
id′
per node j 6= i and identifier
id′ such that |Sj
id′
| = f and Sj
id′
= SGfj (sd
h
j , id
′). Fix h1
preceding h and immediately preceding the last monitoring
round from stage t. Since the actions observed between h1
and h do not depend on SGfj (sd
h
j , id), for each (L
j
id)j∈I with
|Ljid| = f , there exists a history h′ ∈ Hid,t(S, I,R, r) such
that P ~σ
f ,µ(h|h1) = P ~σf ,µ(h′|h1) and h′ may differ from h
exactly in that SGfj (sd
h′
j , id) = L
j
id for each j ∈ I . In par-
ticular, this holds for any history h′ such that every node in
I ′ receives id from some node in I , i.e.:
∪j∈I∗ SGj(sdh
′
j , id) \ S = I ′, (12)
where I∗ ⊆ I is the largest subset such that for every j ∈ I∗
we have Θhj (j) = Good and seq(id) /∈ Misshj . If we add over
every such history h′, then we are adding over all the seeds
for nodes in I∗ such that 12 holds. By PRNG1, when ev-
ery seed among the set that yields Sj
id′
for every id′ 6= id
is generated uniformly at random, this is approximately
close to nodes in I∗ selecting the subset of neighbours to
whom they forward the event uniformly at random, with
an error lower than ξ. This event occurs with probabil-
ity P id,f (I ′|I∗, R) ≤ P id,f (I ′|I,R), since I∗ ⊆ I . For ev-
ery such h′, the history immediately succeeding belongs to
Hid,t(S∪I, I ′, R\I ′, r+1). Since the above holds for any h,
an approximate fraction P id,f (I ′|I∗, R) of the histories from
Hid,t(S, I,R, r) has the nodes from I∗ forwarding id to those
from I ′. Hence, we can write:∑
h∈Hid,t(S∪I,I′,R\I′,r+1) P
~σ∗(h|z) ≤
≤ ∑h∈Hid,t(S,I,R,r) P ~σ∗(h|z)(P id,f (I ′|I∗, R) + ξ) ≤
≤ ∑h∈Hid,t(S,I,R,r) P ~σ∗(h|z)(P id,f (I ′|I,R) + ξ).
By the hypothesis, for each I ′, there exists SGfi such that
for an arbitrarily small ξ′ > 0:∑
h∈Hid,t(S∪I,I′,R\I′,r+1) P
~σ∗(h|z) ≤
≤ (Qid,f (S, I,R, r) + ξ′)(P id,f (I ′|I,R) + ξ) =
≤ Qid,f (S, I,R, r)P id,f (I ′|I,R)+
+ξ′(ξ + P id,f (I ′|I,R) +Qid,f (S, I,R, r)) =
= Qid,f (S ∪ I, I ′, R \ I ′, r + 1) + ξ′′,
where:
ξ′′ = ξ′(ξ + P id,f (I ′|I,R) +Qid,f (S, I,R, r)).
Since ξ′′ is also arbitrarily small, the result holds.
